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The Multiple-Marriage Society and




Nearly everyone knows about the transformation of the American
family that has taken place over the last couple of decades. The changes,
from the latter half of the 1970s into the present, comprise one of the great
events of our age. Articles on one aspect or another of the phenomenon
frequent the popular press, and a special edition of Newsweek was recently
devoted to the topic.' The traditional "Leave It To Beaver" family no
longer prevails in American society. To be sure, families consisting of a
wage-earning husband, a homemaking and child-rearing wife, and their
two joint children still exist. But because divorce rates are high 2 and
remarriage abounds,3 many married couples have or will end life having
Copyright © 1991 by Lawrence W. Waggoner.
tThis article is an updated and expanded version of the inaugural Hugh J. Tamisiea and
Frank Tamisiea Lecture, delivered by the author at the University of Iowa College of Law on
October 6, 1989, and of the Mortimer H. Hess Memorial Lecture, delivered by the author at
the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on December 4, 1989, and
published in 45 Rec. A. B. City N.Y. 339 (1990), under the title Spousal Probate Rights in a
Multiple-Marriage Society.
*Director of Research and Chief Reporter, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate
Code; Reporter, Drafting Committee to Revise Article II of the Uniform Probate Code. The
author also serves as the Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School,
and as Reporter, Restatement of Property, Donative Transfers. The author wishes to thank
Eleanor B. Alter, Mary Ann Glendon, John H. Langbein, Malcolm A. Moore, and Patricia J.
Roberts for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Special Edition, The 21st Century Family, Newsweek (Winter/Spring 1990).
2. mhe.current level of marital disruption is very high. [A 1989 study] estimated that
almost two-thirds of recent first marriages would be likely to disrupt if current levels
persist. Further work leads us to suspect that 60% may be closer to the mark. The exact
level of marital disruption is much less important, however, than the social fact that the
majority of recent first marriages will not last a lifetime.
Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic and Institu-
tional Change, 27 Demography 483, 485 (1990).
3. Most Americans marry, and if the marriage ends in divorce, more than three-fourths
marry again.... During the 1970-83 period the annual totals of remarriages of
previously divorced men and women increased by 82 percent. . . . In contrast,
marriages of single and widowed persons declined. Currently about 1 out of 3
American brides and grooms have [sic] been married before, up from 1 out of 4 in
1970.... Remarriage rates for both divorced men and women declined during the
1970-83 period. Remarriage rates dropped even though the number of remarriages
was increasing because the pool of divorced persons available for remarriage was
increasing faster than the number of remarriages.... The estimated annual national
total of remarriages for previously divorced men and women increased almost every
year from 1970 to 1983. The number of previously divorced brides was 404,000 in
1970 and rose to 736,000 in 1983. During that period more men than women'
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children from prior marriages on one or both sides. Families are routinely
headed by two adults working outside the home, or by a single parent.
Unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples, sometimes with chil-
dren, are also unmistakable parts of the American family scene.
And, if you think we live in a multiple- marriage society now, just wait!
Marriage may get even more "multiple" with the increasing prevalence in
the population of those marriages that are more likely to end in divorce
than others-marriages in which one or both partners were divorced
before4 and marriages of couples who cohabited prior to marriage.5
Inevitably, this transformation has exerted new tensions on traditional
wealth-succession laws, as well as on overlapping fields such as family, social
security, and pension law.
II. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE REVISION PFOJEcT
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC or Code) is over twenty years old
and was developed prior to the multiple-marriage society. Article II of the
Code has now undergone a systematic round of review.6 One of the main
remaried single persons, but the percent increase in the number of remarriages was
the same for both sexes. The number of previously divorced grooms increased 83
percent from 423,000 to 773,000. In the 14-year period, 8.2 million previously
divorced women and 8.7 million previously divorced men remarried.
U.S. Dep't o1 Health & Human Serv., Pub. No. 89-1923, Remarriages & Subsequent
Divorces-United States 1-2, 5 (1989).
4. A Department of Health and Human Services publication comments on the higher
propensity of remarried divorced persons to divorce again:
Generally, the more times a divorcing person has been married, the briefer the
duration of the marriage.... It may be that some selection factor is at work and that
people who divorce repeatedly are likely to regard divorce as an acceptable solution
to an unpleasant marriage and resort to it with increasing promptness.
See McCarthy, A Comparison of the Probability of the Dissolution of First and Second
Marriages, 15 Demography 345 (1978).
5. On the higher propensity of couples who cohabited prior to marriage to divorce, see
Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, Working
Paper No. 5 (Nat'l Survey of Families & Households, 1989) ("[c]ohabiting unions are much less
stable than those that begin as marriages .... [m]arriages that are preceded by living together
have 50 percent higher disruption rates than marriages without premarital cohabitation"). See
also Newsweek, supra note 1, at 57 ( quoting a sociologist to the effect that "cohabitation is a
relationship that attracts those, mainly men, who are looking for an easy out ... and it is
uncertain what, if anything, it contributes to marriage"); Bumpass, supra note 2, at 487:
If many couples are using cohabitation to test their relationship, and if 40% split up
without marrying, then we expect those who do marry to have more stable marriages
than would have been the case in the absence of cohabitation. Despite all the attention
given the results on the higher divorce rate of marriages preceded by cohabitation,
this finding is not contrary evidence on this point. Cohabitation is selective and
includes a lower proportion of couples who hold traditional family attitudes and a
higher proportion of those who are uncertain about their relationship.
(citations omitted).
6. The review was conducted by the joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code
and the Drafting Committee to Revise Article II of the Uniform Probate Code. The Joint
Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code is composed of three representatives each from
the Uniform Laws Conference (Clark A. Gravel of Vermont, Professor John H. Langbein of
Yale Law School, and Dean Robert A. Stein of the University of Minnesota Law School); the
American Bar Association (Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., of Wisconsin, Professor and former Dean
[1991]
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objectives of the project was to develop sensible probate rules for the
altered and ever-changing climate of marital behavior. Article II of the
UPC deals with the substantive law of intestacy, wills, and donative
transfers. The Article II revisions have now been completed and approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL). These revisions will also be submitted to NCCUSL for promul-
gation as a free standing Uniform Act on Intestacy, Wills, and Donative
Transfers, which can be adopted without the procedural and other provi-
sions of the full Code.
The revisions of Article II are far reaching. To some degree, nearly
every section in Article II has been revised. The full scope of the project is
too sweeping to be captured in a single paper. In the present paper, I wish
to single out for discussion four parts of the revision project: the spouse's
intestate share (section 2-102); the spouse's elective (forced) share (sections
2-201 to 2-207); the spouse's rights as against a premarital will (section 2-
301); and revocation of benefits to the now-former spouse in the case of
divorce (section 2- 804). These statutory provisions are appended at the end
of this paper. Of the new provisions, these four will have the greatest
impact on the multiple-marriage society.
I shall discuss these provisions of the project in terms of a story about
a fictional couple, Ben and Elaine. Several versions of their story will
-demonstrate the impact of the UPC revisions upon our multiple-marriage
society.
Ben and Elaine got married, their marriage went well, and they
prospered. They bought a house in joint tenancy. They conferred with an
estate planning attorney who set them up with reciprocal wills and a
revocable inter vivos trust. Ben acquired an employer-provided retirement
plan, and bought a substantial amount of life insurance. All of these
documents-the will, the revocable trust, the retirement plan, and the life
insurance policy-named Elaine as the sole beneficiary at Ben's death. Ben,
an only child whose parents had died, tried to get on the good side of
Elaine's parents by naming them as the alternate beneficiary.
Edward C. Halbach, Jr., of the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, and
Malcolm A. Moore of Washington); and the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (J.
Pennington Straus of Pennsylvania, who serves as Chairman of the Board, Charles A. Collier,
Jr., of California, and Raymond H. Young of Massachusetts, with Harrison F. Durand of New
Jersey and Harley J. Spitler of California as Emeritus Representatives). The Law School
Liaison to the Board is Professor and former Dean Eugene F. Scoles of the University of
Oregon School of Law and the Probate Judges Liaison is James R. Wade of Colorado.
Professor Richard V. Wellman of University of Georgia School of Law serves as the Board's
Executive Director.
The Drafting Committee to Revise Article II of the Uniform Probate Code was chaired by
Richard V. Wellman. The members were the three Uniform Laws Conference members of the
Joint Editorial Board (Gravel, Langbein, and Stein) and Commissioners Florence Nelson Crisp
of North Carolina, Richard E. Ford of West Virginia, and Oglesby H. Young of Oregon. The
Advisers to the Drafting Committee were Professor Martin D. Begleiter of Drake University
School of Law, representing the American Bar Association, and Professor Gail McKnight
Beckman of Georgia State University, representing the National Association of Women
Lawyers.
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A. Section 2-804: The Revocation-Upon-Divorce Provision
As time went on, regrettably, Ben and Elaine grew apart. Ben devoted
his time to his work and neglected Elaine. Elaine devoted her time to Carl,
an old flame she almost married before she met Ben. Eventually Ben and
Elaine's difficulties led to divorce. Shortly after the divorce, Elaine married
Carl. Shortly after Elaine's marriage to Carl, Ben died. The key to the
distribution of Ben's assets focuses on a section that is quite commonly
found in probate codes-the revocation-upon-divorce section.
1. Conventional Statutes
The conventional non-UPC provision7 and the pre-1990 UPC
provision 8 treat the disposition in Ben's will in favor of Elaine as revoked,
but do not extend that treatment to the house held in joint tenancy, nor to
Ben's revocable trust, retirement plan, or life insurance policy. The effect of
revoking the provision for Elaine in Ben's will is to treat Elaine as having
predeceased Ben, giving effect to the alternative provision in Ben's will in
favor of Elaine's parents.
Due no doubt to the increased usage of will substitutes, such as
revocable trusts, the courts have come under increasing pressure to use
statutory construction techniques to extend statutes like the non-UPC and
the pre-1990 UPC measures to various types of revocable dispositions-
dispositions that are wills in function and substance, though not in form.9
As one might expect, the results of these cases have not been uniform. One
of the more notable recent cases is Clymer v. Mayo, 10 a 1985 decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court ex-
tended the scope of the statute beyond its terms by holding the statute
applicable to a revocable inter vivos trust. However, the court was also
careful to restrict its "holding to the particular facts of this case-specifically
the existence of a revocable pour-over trust funded entirely at the time of
7. E.g, Mass. Gen. Law ch. 191, § 9 (1981); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-1.4
(1981).
8. UPC § 2-302 (1989).
9. Aparz from statutes, divorce decrees and separation agreements usually do not effect
a revocation of life insurance or similar beneficiary designations of a former spouse unless they
say so specifically. Rountree v. Frazee, 282 Ala. 142, 209 So.2d 424 (1968) (One may name
anyone as beneficiary on a life insurance policy, divorce per se does not affect or defeat any
of the former spouse's rights as designated beneficiary.); American Health & Life Ins. v.
Binford, 511 So.2d 1250 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (description of wife in policy "is merely the
showing of a relationship in existence at the time of the execution of the contract" and divorce
"has no automatic effect on the provisions of the insurance policy"); Gerhard v. Travelers Ins.,
107 N.J. Super. 414, 258 A.2d 724 (1969) (separation agreement containing "general release
of all claims to each other's estate" does not divest former wife of interest as named beneficiary;
her claim under the policy was not against her former husband, but against the insurance
company); Romero v. Melendez, 83 N.M. 776,498 P.2d 305 (1972) ("where the divorce decree
makes a definite disposition of the insurance policies, the [former] wife's interest as a
beneficiary can be defeated by such disposition.., cases holding conversely do so on the basis
of the absence of a clear divorce decree"); see also Cannon v. Hamilton, 174 Ohio St. 268, 189
N.E.2d 152 (1963); Lewis v. Lewis, 693 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985); Bersch v.
VanKleeck, 112 Wis. 2d 594, 334 N.W.2d 114 (1983). But cf. Stiles v. Stiles, 21 Mass. Ct. App.
514, 487 N.E2d 874 (1986).
10. 393 Mass. 754, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (1985).
[1991]
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the decedent's death .. ."I' The testator's will devised the residue of her
estate to the trustee of an unfunded life insurance trust she executed on the
same day; the life insurance was employer-paid. When connected to a
pour-over devise, this type of trust is the easiest to label the same as a "will"
and thus to say the statute applies. Some courts have reached a similar
result,12 but most courts are not willing to extend similar statutory provi-
sions to will substitutes unconnected to a pour-over devise. This is true even
though the will substitute is also the functional equivalent of a "will," such
as a retirement plan beneficiary designation13 or life insurance beneficiary
designation.
14
2. 1990 UPC Extends to All Revocable Dispositions
As revised, the 1990 UPC revocation-upon-divorce section, section
2-804, is the most comprehensive measure of its kind. A few states have
enacted piecemeal legislation tending in the same direction. 15 The problem
11. 473 N.E.2d at 1093. The court's statement that the receptacle trust, into which the
decedents residuary estate poured, was one to be "funded entirely at the time of the
decedents death" was a misdescription. As indicated in the text, the receptacle trust in the
Clymer case was a life insurance trust. By designating the trustee as the beneficiary of the life
insurance policy, the testator-insured conferred on the trustee a contract right to collect the
life insurance proceeds on the testator-insured's death. Under well-established trust law, that
contract right constituted the trust res. Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250
(1934); Bose v. Meury, 112 N.J. Eq. 62, 163 A. 276 (1932); Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank,
201 Or. 648, 271 P.2d 653 (1954); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 57 comment f, § 82
comment b, § 84 comment b (1959). Thus, the trust was not without a trust res prior to the
decedent's death.
The court's misunderstanding of this point forced it to consider a question not actually
raised by the case: Does the Massachusetts Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act
validate a pour-over devise to an unfunded trust? Although the Uniform Testamentary
Additions to Trusts Act, 8A U.L.A. 599 (1983), incorporated into the pre-1990 UPC as
§ 2-511, is somewhat unclear on this point, the Massachusetts court in the Clymer case held that
it does. As revised in 1990, § 2- 511 makes it clear that a pour-over devise to an unfunded trust
is authorized, and the amended § 2-511 will be submitted to NCCUSL in 1991 for
promulgation as a revised Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.
12. E.g., Miller v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 637 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1981) (where the testator's
will devised the residue of his estate to the trustee of an unfunded life insurance trust, court
held the revocation statute applicable because the pour-over devise incorporated the life
insurance trust into the will by reference).
13. E.g., Pepper v. Peacher, 742 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1987); Adams Estate, 447 Pa. 177, 288
A.2d 514 (1972).
14. E.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Stitzel, 31 Cumb. L. Rev. 169, 1 Pa. Fiduc.2d
316 (C.P. Cumberland County 1981).
15. As yet, no state has enacted a provision as comprehensive as the 1990 UPC provision.
Michigan and Ohio have statutes transforming spousal joint tenancies in land into tenancies
in common upon the spouses' divorce. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.102 (West 1988); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 5302.20(C)(5) (Baldwin 1990). Ohio, Oklahoma, and Tennessee recently
have enacted legislation effecting a revocation of provisions for the settlor's former spouse in
revocable inter vivos trusts. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1339.62 (Baldwin, 1990); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 60, § 175 (West Supp. 1990); Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-50-115 (Supp. 1989) (applies to
revocable and irrevocable inter vivos trusts unless, among other things, "the trust agreement
... expressly provides otherwise"). Statutes in Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas relate to
the consequence of divorce on life insurance and retirement plan beneficiary designations.
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.101 (West 1988); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1339.63 (March
1990 Ohio Legis. Bull. No. 3, at 60-61); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 178 (West Supp. 1990); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. §§ 3.632-.633 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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with revocation-upon-divorce statutes is not that courts adopt an overly
narrow construction of them, but that the terms of the statutes themselves
do not expressly cover all of the arrangements that are functionally
equivalent to wills. Section 2-804 rectifies the problem by expressly expand-
ing the terms of the statute to cover "will substitutes," whether or not
connected to a pour-over devise. Thus, the statute covers revocable inter
vivos trusts, life insurance and retirement plan beneficiary designations,
payable-on-death accounts, and other revocable dispositions made before
the divorce or annulment by divorced individuals to their former spouses.
Unless provided otherwise,' 6 subsection (b)(1) of revised section 2-804 not
only revokes the provision in Ben's will in favor of Elaine but also in Ben's
retirement plan,' 7 life insurance policy, and revocable inter vivos trust.
Elaine also will not be able to take the joint tenancy property by
survivorship. Subsection (b)(2) of revised section 2-804 effects a severance
of the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time
of the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship,
by transforming their ownership interests into a tenancy in common. In
effect, subsection (b)(2) aligns joint tenancies with tenancies by the entirety,
which are automatically severed upon divorce of the tenants. Note that the
severance of spousal joint tenancies upon divorce is merely an application
of the general principle embraced by the new statute that all revocable
dispositions are presumptively revoked upon divorce. A joint tenancy is
unilaterally severable by either joint tenant, meaning that each spouse in
effect has a power to revoke the other's survivorship interest with respect to
half of the property.
If Elaine is prevented from benefiting under any of Ben's documents,
who does benefit? Remember that the conventional statutes only revoke
dispositions to Elaine; they do so by invoking the fiction that Elaine
predeceased Ben. This would give Ben's property to Elaine's parents.1
8
16. Section 2-804 is inapplicable if provided otherwise in "a governing instrument, a court
order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced
individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment ......
17. If Ben's retirement plan was covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), there is a danger that the statutory provision will be preempted. Section 514(a)
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988), provides that the provisions of Tides I and IV of
ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan" governed by ERISA. There are a variety of arguments as to why
ERISA should not preempt the proposed statutory provision in the Uniform Laws project;
these are too complicated to state here, but they are stated in the Official Commentary to that
provision. In case these arguments do not prevail, however, and § 2-804(b)(1) is found
preempted, 'I 2-804(h)(2) imposes an offsetting personal liability on the recipient in the
amount of any payment received as a result of preemption.
18. In several cases, treating the former spouse as predeceasing the testator triggered a
gift in the governing instrument in favor of relatives of the former spouse who, after the
divorce, were no longer relatives of the testator. See Clymer v. Mayo, 393 Mass. 754, 473
N.E,2d 1084 (1985) (concluding that treating former spouse as predeceasing the testator
meant that former spouse's nieces and nephews succeed to interest in trust); Porter v. Porter,
286 N.W.2d 649, 652-53 (Iowa 1979) (concluding that the distribution of the testator's estate
to the stepson would occur because of the spouse's inability to take under the will for any
reason, including divorce); Estate of Coffed, 46 N.Y.2d 514, 518-20, 414 N.Y.S.2d 893,
894-95, 387 lq.E.2d 1209, 1210-11 (1979) (stating that those obtaining an interest in the estate
included the former spouse's child by a prior marriage); Bloom v. Selfon, 520 Pa. 519, 522-26,
[1991]
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Because such an outcome seems inconsistent with Ben's likely intent,
revised section 2-804 also revokes benefits to the former spouse's relatives
as well as to the former spouse.1 9 The general predicate of this provision is
that, during the divorce process or in the aftermath of the divorce, the
former spouse's relatives are more likely than not to side with the former
spouse. This will result in breaking down or weakening any former ties that
may have previously developed between the transferor and the former
spouse's relatives.
B. Section 2-102: The Spouse's Share in Intestate Succession
Let us turn back the clock now and give Ben and Elaine another
chance. Not only did they get married, but they beat the odds and stayed
married. In fact, they had a wonderful marriage. At some point in the
future, however, the law of mortality-which even the Uniform Law
Commissioners can not repeal-caught up to Ben and he died. Elaine
survived, along with their two adult children and a number of grandchil-
dren. Ben, it seems, was a procrastinator, and just never got around to
seeing an estate-planning attorney.
What is, or should be, Elaine's share in intestate succession? Section
2-102 of the revised 1990 UPC rewards the surviving spouse in marriages
such as Ben and Elaine's by granting Ben's entire intestate estate to
Elaine.20 Elaine's share is Ben's entire intestate estate even though Ben was
also survived by their two joint children.2 ' Elaine would also be granted the
entire intestate estate had they been childless, since neither of Ben's parents
survived.
In all other cases, the surviving spouse's intestate share is a lump sum
plus a fraction of the remaining balance. If the decedent leaves no surviving
children, but a parent, the surviving spouse's share is the first $200,000 plus
three-fourths of the remaining balance.2 2 If all of the decedent's surviving
555 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1980) (reflecting that the testator's divorce does not nullify alternative
distribution provisions in favor of the former spouse's uncle; such property is distributed as if
the former spouse predeceased the testator); Estate of Graef, 124 Wis. 2d 24, 29-33, 39-42, 368
N.W.2d 633, 634-36, 639-41 (1985) (concluding that the effect of treating former spouse as
predeceasing the testator was that the testator's estate passes to the former spouse's parents
since there was no issue and the testator's parents predeceased the testator).
19. In the somewhat comparable "slayer-rule" provision, § 2-803 denies revocable
benefits to the murderer, but not to the murderer's relatives. The rationale for the distinction
between divorce and murder is that, in the case of divorce, the relatives of each former spouse
are likely to side with that former spouse. A murderer's relatives, however, are as likely to
sympathize with the murderer's victim as with the murderer. UPG § 2-803 (1990).
The impact of revocation under § 2-804(d) is that the unrevoked provisions of the
governing instrument take effect as if the divorced individual's former spouse and the former
spouse's relatives had disclaimed the revoked provisions. UPC § 2-804(d) (1990).
20. Under § 2-102 of the pre-1990 UPC, the only time the surviving spouse was granted
the entire intestate estate was when the decedent left neither a surviving descendant nor a
surviving parent. UPC § 2-102 (1989). As for Elaine, § 2-102(3) of the pre-1990 UPC would
have granted her the first $50,000 plus one-half of the remaining balance. UPC § 2-102(3)
(1989).
21. For shorthand purposes, the reference to children refers not only to surviving
children, but also to descendants of the children.
22. For the rationale of this approach, see infra note 33. Under § 2-102(2) of the
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children are also children of the surviving spouse, but the surviving spouse
has a surviving child who is not a child of the decedent, the surviving
spouse's share is the first $150,000 plus one-half of the remaining
balance. 23 If the decedent leaves one or more surviving children who are
not the biological children of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse's
share is the first $100,000 plus one-half of the remaining balance.
24
The only time the surviving spouse's share potentially is less than the
full amount of the intestate estate is when the decedent dies without
children but is survived by a parent or when the decedent has children and
either the decedent or the surviving spouse has children who are not the
biological children of the other. In the case of Ben and Elaine, no reduction
would occur, since Ben's parents had predeceased him and his marriage to
Elaine was the first marriage for each.
We can take the story a little farther into the future. After Ben died
intestate, survived by Elaine, suppose that Elaine married Carl, who by then
was either a widower or a divorce6. Suppose further that some years later,
Elaine died intestate survived by Carl. Because Elaine had children by her
marriage to Ben, Carl would not necessarily take Elaine's entire intestate
estate. Carl would take the first $100,000 plus half of the remaining
balance, with the other half of the remaining balance going to Elaine's
children by her marriage to Ben. Had Elaine and Ben been childless, and
had Elaine and Carl had children by their marriage to each other, Carl's
share would depend upon whether he had children by a prior marriage. If
he did, Carl's share would be the first $150,000 plus half of the remaining
balance, with the other half going to Elaine's children. If Carl had no
children by a prior marriage and Elaine's parents predeceased her, Carl's
intestate share would be the entire intestate estate.
What is the rationale for this approach? First, we will consider Elaine's
share in Ben's intestate estate. Then we will examine Carl's share in Elaine's
intestate estate.
Various considerations drive the formulation of intestate-succession
laws. The most obvious and perhaps predominant consideration is the
decedent's intention. Of course, the law gives effect to intention by
imputation. Several items of evidence support the judgment to impute to
Ben the intention to give all his property to Elaine. One is that empirical
studies reveal the existence of a strong preference within the populace for
granting the entire estate to the surviving spouse, even when the decedent
has surviving children.25 Another is that the grant to the spouse of the
pre-1990 UPC, the surviving spouse's share in this situation would have been the first $50,000
plus one-half of the remaining balance. UPC § 2-102(2) (1989).
23. Under § 2-102(3) of the pre-1990 UPC, the surviving spouse's share in this situation
would have been the first $50,000 plus one-half of the remaining balance. UPC § 2-102(3)
(1989).
24. Under § 2-102(4) of the pre-1990 UPC, the surviving spouse's share in this situation
would have been one-half of the intestate estate. UPC § 2-102(4) (1989).
25. Some of these studies were based on an examination of the probated wills of similarly
situated decedents who died during a particular time frame in a particular locality. E.g., M.
Sussman, J. Cates, & D. Smith, The Family and Inheritance 86, 89-90, 143-45 (1970);
Browder, Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 Mich. L.
[1991]
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entire intestate estate is aligned with trends in intestate-succession law
throughout the United States and Europe.26 Professor Mary Ann Glendon
refers to this trend as the "shrinking circle of heirs" phenomenon. 27 This
trend indicates that throughout the U.S. and Europe, "the position of the
surviving spouse has steadily improved everywhere at the expense of the
decedent's blood relatives." 28 Glendon points out that this trend "strikingly
illustrate[s] the movement of modem marriage into the foreground of
family relationships." 29 It recognizes "the gradual attenuation of legal
bonds among family members outside the conjugal unit of husband, wife,
and children"30 and "the tendency to view a marriage that lasts until death
as a union of the economic interests of the spouses."3'
Granting the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate in cases in
which neither spouse has surviving children by a prior marriage or in cases
in which the decedent has no surviving children or parent 2 therefore
Rev. 1303, 1307-08 (1969); Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth
Transmission at Death, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 241,252 (1963); Gibson, Inheritance of Community
Property in Texas-A Need for Reform, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 359, 364-66 (1969); Price, The
Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community PropertyJurisdiction, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 277,
283, 311-17 (1975).
Other studies were based on interviews with living persons. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United
States, 1978 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 319, 351-54, 358-64, 366-68 (found the majority favored
granting entire estate to the spouse regardless of the level of wealth involved); Contemporary
Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of
the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 1041, 1089 (1978) (found the
percentage who favored granting the entire estate to the spouse decreased as the level of
wealth increased). See also U.K. Law Commission, Report on Family Law: Distribution on
Intestacy, 1989, No. 187, at 28 (reporting that 72% of respondents favored granting the entire
estate to the surviving spouse if the decedent owned a house and the decedents children were
grown up, 79% favored granting the entire estate to the surviving spouse if the decedent had
a house and young children, and 79% favored granting the entire estate to the surviving
spouse if the decedent had no house but young children).
26. A recent report of the U.K. Law Commission recommended granting the surviving
spouse the entire intestate estate in all circumstances. U.K. Law Commission, Report on
Family Law: Distribution on Intestacy, 1989, No. 187, at 8-12.
27. M. Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 238 (1989).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 239.
30. Id. at 238.
31. Id. at 240.
32. If the decedent is childless, revised § 2-102 grants the surviving spouse the entire
intestate estate only if the decedent leaves no surviving parent. If the decedent leaves a,
surviving parent, revised § 2-102(2) grants the surviving spouse the first $200,000 (actually,
the first $243,000 when the probate exemptions and allowances are added in) plus three-
fourths of the remaining balance. Very few intestate estates exceed $243,000, and still fewer
exceed this value by any substantial margin. Thus, in almost all cases, the surviving spouse will
receive the entire intestate estate even if the decedent is childless but leaves a surviving parent.
Why not officially grant the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate when the decedent
is childless but leaves a surviving parent? The rationale is that a childless decedent survived by
a spouse and a parent, and who dies intestate with an estate significantly in excess of $243,000,
most likely died at a fairly young age without expecting such a large estate. See Fellows, Simon
& Rau, supra note 25, at 336-39 (reporting that, among those surveyed, 69% with estates of
$100,000 and over had wills and further reporting that 61% of those age 46-54 had wills, 63%
age 55-64 had wills, and 85% of those 65 and over had wills, but only 8% of those between the
ages of 17 and 24 had wills).
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conforms with modern trends. Observe, however, the other side of the
equation. As Professor Glendon noted, granting the surviving spouse the
entire intestate estate comes "at the expense of the decedent's blood
relatives."2 3 Of course, in the competition for the decedent's property, not
all blood relatives are created equal. One must rank the decedent's blood
relatives by category or degree of relationship in an intestate-succession
law; there is no room for subordinating the claim of a disliked uncle in
order to benefit a favored aunt disproportionately. Notice the categories
that lose out to the surviving spouse under revised section 2-102: one losing
category is composed of the decedent's collateral relatives or ancestors more
remote than parents; the other losing category is composed of the dece-
dent's children or descendants of deceased children.
Between these two categories, typical decedents presumably view their
children as having higher claims to at least some portion of their property
than the claims of their collateral relatives and/or ancestors more remote
than parents. On the surface, the revised UPC appears not to recognize any
such distinction because it grants the surviving spouse the entire estate to
the exclusion of both categories. In fact, the revised intestacy scheme
distinguishes between these categories in the sense that the two categories
"lose" to the surviving spouse for quite different reasons.
The 1990 UPC is predicated on the notion that decedents do not
perceive their own children as losing. Rather, they see the surviving spouses
as occupying somewhat of a dual role, not only as their primary beneficia-
ries, but also as conduits through which to benefit their children. If Ben
died prematurely, at a time when their children were still minors, Elaine
would be better equipped than their children to use Ben's property for the
benefit of their children as well as for herself. If Ben was older at death,
when their children were middle-aged working adults, Elaine would
probably be older and have greater economic needs than their children. In
this latter case, the conduit theory assumes that Ben's children will
eventually inherit any unconsumed portion of his property from Elaine
upon her death.
The conduit theory does not apply to decedents' collateral relatives or
ancestors who are more remote than parents. Their "loss" is likely to be
permanent. When a decedent leaves only a surviving spouse and collateral
relatives or ancestors more remote than parents, a typical decedent
presumably sees the surviving spouse as sole beneficiary. The decedent
An intestate estate of this size likely consists of a large tort recovery. Consider Ben and
Elaine. Under many survival-type statutes, a tort recovery becomes part of the decedents
estate, to be distributed like other estate assets. E.g., Unif. Law Commissioners' Model Survival
& Death Act § 2(b) (1979), 8A U.L.A. 593 (1983); 4 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, Law of
Torts § 25.16 at 614 nn. 8 & 9 (2d ed. 1986). Suppose that shortly after their marriage, Ben
was injured on his way to work by a negligent truck driver employed by a large, publicly held
corporation, and that Ben eventually died from those injuries. Ben's estate, swelled by a tort
recovery stemming from the accident, amounted to a million dollars. Disregarding the probate
exemptions and allowances for the sake of simplicity, the formula adopted has the advantage
of granting Elaine, who might well remarry, a thoroughly adequate share of $800,000
($200,000 plus $600,000), with a $200,000 return to Ben's parents, who bore the cost of
raising and educating Ben.
33. M. Glendon, supra note 27, at 238.
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does not ordinarily expect the surviving spouse, while alive or at death, to
share any significant portion of the decedent's property with those other
relatives.
We will return now to the case of Elaine and Carl. In this marriage,
recall that, if Elaine had children by Ben (whether or not she also had
children by Carl), Carl's intestate share is the first $100,000 plus half of the
remaining balance; the other half goes to Elaine's children. Also recall that,
if Elaine had children by Carl but none by Ben, Carl's intestate share is the
first $150,000 plus half of the remaining balance if Carl had children by a
prior marriage; the other half of the remaining balance goes to Elaine's
children.
The rationale for this is that the existence of children who are notjoint
children renders the conduit theory problematic. When a decedent is
survived by children not descended from the surviving spouse, or by
children of the surviving spouse -not descended from the decedent, the
decedent has a surviving spouse with divided loyalties and, hence, a spouse
who is a less reliable conduit. If the surviving spouse in either of these two
cases were to be granted the entire intestate estate, the prospect of the
decedent's children recouping their "loss" later, by inheriting the uncon-
sumed portion of the decedent's property from the surviving spouse, is less
secure. The existence of children by a prior marriage places the surviving
spouse in a moral conflict as to how later to divide the property he or she
inherited from the decedent.8 4 When the surviving spouse later dies, his or
her natural instinct is to treat all of his or her own children equally; and if
the surviving spouse dies intestate, the intestate-succession law will auto-
matically grant those children equal shares.
Thus, the problem in the stepparent situations becomes one of striking
a reasonable balance between the claim of the surviving spouse and that of
the decedent's children. The dominant objective is to grant the surviving
spouse an adequate share. By this, the revised UPC does not mean to
restrict the spouse's share to no more than necessary to provide him or her
with the bare necessities of life, but rather to grant a share that is
commensurate with the size of the estate and the circumstances of the
family make-up. In implementing this idea, the revised UPC invokes the
lump-sum-plus-a-fraction-of-the-remaining-balance device. In the typical
intestate estate of small to modest size, this means that the surviving spouse
still will take the entire estate, especially since the probate exemptions and
allowances, which under the 1990 UPC amount to a minimum of $43,000,
go to the surviving spouse in addition to the lump sum portion of the
formula.8 5
In the more sizeable intestate estates, infrequent though they may be,
the revised UPC approach is predicated on the notion that wealthier
34. The possibility that the same moral conflict will arise after the decedent's death,
should the surviving spouse remarry and have children by his or her new spouse, exists but
must be disregarded. As currently constituted, intestate- succession law requires the decision
as to how much to award the surviving spouse to be made on the basis of the facts existing at
the decedent's death.
35. See UPC § 2-404, 405 (1990) (too subsidiary to include in appendix).
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intestate decedents would feel that some provision for their children would
not deprive the surviving spouse of an adequate share. Thus, to provide the
decedent's own biological children with at least some protection against the
claim of the surviving spouse's other children, the revised UPC carves off a
share in the larger intestate estates for the decedent's own children.
Remember also that the spouse's intestate share is in addition to any
nonprobate property to which she might succeed by reason of the dece-
dent's death such as joint tenancies, joint checking, savings or money-
market accounts, life insurance, and pension benefits.
The revised UPC recognizes that the surviving spouse's loyalties are
more divided when the decedent has children by a prior marriage than
when only the surviving spouse has children by a prior marriage. In
recognition of this difference, the surviving spouse in the former case is
granted the first $100,000 ($143,000, with the minimum probate exemp-
tions and allowances added in) plus fifty percent of any remaining balance;
the surviving spouse in the latter case is granted the first $150,000
($193,000, with the minimum probate exemptions and allowances added
in) plus fifty percent of any remaining balance.
This approach is admittedly a crude solution to the survivor's divided-
loyalties problem. If the purpose is to strike a reasonable balance between
the objective of granting the surviving spouse an adequate share and the
objective of assuring that the surviving spouse does not later deprive the
decedent's children of the unconsumed portion of the decedent's property,
a more responsive solution might be to reinvoke the idea of common-law
dower. When stepchildren are involved, the law might give the surviving
spouse the use of the property for life, but upon the death of the surviving
spouse force a return of the unconsumed portion of that property to the
decedent's own biological children. Strictly speaking, no one would suggest
reinvoking true common-law dower, under which the surviving spouse
would be entitled to a life estate in one-third of the decedent's land. Instead,
the device would create a statutory trust for the benefit of the surviving
spouse in all the decedent's property, land, and personalty. The trust could
take a variety of forms. One approach would give the surviving spouse the
right to a!l of the income generated by the trust for life, coupled with a
power in the spouse or the statutory trustee to invade the corpus of the trust
to the extent other sources of income prove inadequate for the spouse's
support and maintenance in accordance with the spouse's accustomed
standard of living. However such a trust might be structured during the
surviving spouse's lifetime, the trust would provide that upon the survivor's
death, any remaining income and corpus would go to the decedent's own
biological children and not stepchildren unless adopted by the decedent.
The statutory-trust approach responds to another troublesome fea-
ture of conventional intestate-succession law. As the statutes are currently
constituted, the decision as to how much to award the surviving spouse
must be made on the basis of the facts existing at the decedent's death. This
does not take account of the possibility that a surviving spouse who had no
children by a prior marriage at the decedent's death might subsequently
remarry and have children. Conventional intestate-succession schemes
provide no mechanism for adjustment where a surviving spouse's moral
conflict arises after the decedent's death. The statutory-trust approach, on
223 [1991]
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the other hand, if applied in all intestacy cases in which the decedent leaves
a surviving spouse and one or more children, and not just in cases in which
the moral conflict is known to exist at the decedent's death, provides a
solution to this problem.
The statutory-trust approach, therefore, is commendable, except for
the fact that its compulsion by a state would likely be considered offensive
by many surviving spouses and it makes little practical sense. Putting aside
the potential offensiveness, the strength of which would be difficult to
predict, it is simply not practical to compel a statutory trust in every
intestacy case with a surviving spouse and one or more children, with
respect to mainly small estates of, say, $15,000 to $25,000. 36 In the end, the
statutory-trust approach was not adopted, leaving it to decedents with
enough property at stake to warrant a trust to seek professional advice and
decide for themselves whether or not to establish one, by will or inter vivos
deed.
C. Sections 2-201 to 2-207: The Redesigned Elective Share
As we have just seen, the revised UPC intestate-succession law visual-
izes a marriage in which the decedent wants to give the spouse all of the
estate; or, if there are no children but a parent or children by a prior
marriage, all of a smaller estate and a substantial portion of a larger estate.
The revised UPC imputes to Ben the desire to give all of his property to
Elaine and imputes to Elaine a desire to give her property to Carl, except
that it also imputes to her a desire to give some of her property to her
children by her marriage to Ben if she has enough property to do so. If
there is extrinsic evidence to the contrary, we do not want to hear it.
Ordinarily, the only type of contrary evidence the law recognizes is
documentary evidence of a valid will expressing an intent to give the spouse
less or nothing at all. In intestate-succession cases, by definition, there is no
such evidence. We now turn to a situation in which there is such evidence,
a situation in which the decedent leaves a will totally or largely disinheriting
the surviving spouse.37
36. Although the statute could invoke the statutory-trust approach only in estates above
a certain value, or only as to that portion of the estate in excess of a certain value, this is not
completely satisfactory. If the statutory-trust approach were invoked in estates above a certain
value, say $150,000, too many estates would fall just above or just below the line, with
dramatically different outcomes. An estate of $149,000 would not go into a statutory trust, but
one of $151,000 would. Similarly, if the statutory-trust approach were invoked only as to that
portion of the estate in excess of a certain value, again, say $150,000, an estate of $151,000
would produce a statutory trust of a mere $1,000. Since the terms of the statutory trust likely
would provide that the surviving spouse or the statutory trustee invade the corpus for the
benefit of the surviving spouse only in case of need in accordance with the spouse's
accustomed standard of living, a small statutory trust might not be quickly dissipated. The
problem would not be solved by the further step of directing a statutory trust only if the estate
were large enough to produce a statutory trust of at least a certain size, say $50,000. Under this
scheme, the trust would arise only if the estate exceeded the minimum $150,000 figure by
$50,000. This approach suffers from the same arbitrariness-an estate of $199,000 would not
have a statutory trust, but one of $201,000 would have one of $51,000.
37. Note, however, the possibility of a decedent who dies intestate having taken indirect
measures to disinherit the surviving spouse by means of depleting the intestate estate by gifts
or will substitutes. By framing the discussion in terms of a decedent who disinherits the
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1. THE PARTNERSHIP THEORY OF MARRIAGE
Disinheritance of a surviving spouse brings into question the funda-
mental nature of the economic rights of each spouse in a marital relation-
ship and the manner in which society views the institution of marriage. The
contemporary view of marriage is that it is an economic partnership.38 The
partnership theory of marriage, sometimes called -the marital-sharing
theory, is stated in various ways. Sometimes it is portrayed "as an expression
of the presumed intent of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes on an
equal basis, share and share alike."39 Under this approach, the economic
rights of each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken marital
bargain under which the partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest
in the fruits of the marriage, that is, in the property nominally acquired by
surviving sFouse directly by will, I do not intend to indicate that the elective share is
unavailable or never taken in the case of an intestate estate.
38. One of the earliest American expressions of the partnership theory of marriage
appears in the 1963 Report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the President's
Commission on the Status of Women. As quoted in the Prefatory Note to the Uniform Marital
Property Act, the Report states: "Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a
different bur equally important contribution. This fact has become increasingly recognized in
the realities of American family living. While the laws of other countries have reflected this
trend, family laws in the United States have lagged behind." Id. at 97.
The strength of the idea that marriage is an economic partnership is evidenced by a recent
New Jersey case, Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 576 A.2d 872 (1990). In that case, the husband,
after having left his wife of seventeen years, died during the pendency of a divorce proceeding
initiated by the wife. The husband's will left his entire estate to his children by a former
marriage. The court held that the husband's death terminated the divorce proceeding under
which the wife would have been entitled to a share determined under New Jersey's equitable-
distribution statute. The wife also had no recourse under New Jersey's elective-share statute
because that statute withheld an elective share from a surviving spouse if the decedent and
spouse were not living together at the time of the decedents death. Despite the wife's inability
to recover under either the divorce or elective-share statute, the court held:
We conclude ... that the principle that animates both [the equitable-distribution
and elective-share] statutes is that a spouse may acquire an interest in marital
property by virtue of the mutuality of efforts during marriage that contribute to the
creation, acquisition, and preservation of such property. This principle, primarily
equitable in nature, is derived from notions of fairness, common decency, and good
faith. Further, we are convinced that these laws do not reflect a legislative intent to
extinguish the property entitlements of a spouse who finds himself or herself beyond
the reach of either statute because the marriage has realistically but not legally ended
at the time of the other's death.
In the exercise of their common-law jurisdiction, courts should seek to effectuate
sound public policy and mold the law to embody the societal values that are
exemplified by such public policy ....
Id. at 349-50, 576 A.2d at 879.
The constructive trust, we believe, is an appropriate equitable remedy in this type of
case .. . [that] should be invoked and imposed on the marital property under the
control of the executor of [the husband's] estate.., to avoid the uijust enrichment
that would occur if the marital property devolving to [the husband's] estate included
the share beneficially belonging to [the wife].
Id. at 351-55, 576 A.2d at 880-81.
In a footnote, the court noted that efforts were currently pending in the New Jersey
legislature to correct the problem of a surviving spouse who falls outside the protection of both
statutes. Id. at 350 n.3, 576 A.2d at 879 n.3.
39. M. Glendon, supra note 27, at 131.
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and titled in the sole name of either partner during the marriage other than
property acquired by gift or inheritance. A decedent who disinherits her
surviving spouse is seen as having reneged on the bargain. Sometimes the
theory is couched in restitutionary terms, a return-of-contribution notion.
Under this approach, the law grants each spouse an entitlement to
compensation for nonmonetary contributions to the marital enterprise, as
"a recognition of the activity of one spouse in the home and to compensate
not only for this activity but for opportunities lost."40 Sometimes the theory
is stated in aspirational and behavior-shaping terms:
[T]he ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal partner-
ships between spouses who share resources, responsibilities, and
risks...
From a policy standpoint, this partnership framework is desir-
able both because it encourages cooperative commitments be-
tween spouses and because it serves broader egalitarian and
caretaking objectives. In effect, sharing principles hold promise
for bridging traditional public/private divisions between family
and market. A partnership model can cushion the impact of
persistent gender biases in couples' private allocation of home-
making tasks and in the public allocation of salaries and benefits.
By sharing their total resources, families can spread the risks and
benefits of sex-linked roles, the remnants of a socioeconomic
system that makes it difficult for any one individual to accommo-
date a full work and family life...
Not only do partnership principles promote gender equality;
they also support caretaking commitments toward children and
elderly dependents. 4
1
No matter how the rationale is expressed, the community-property
system 42 recognizes the partnership theory,4 but the common-law system is
sometimes thought to deny it. In the ongoing marriage, it is true that the
basic principle in the common-law (title-based) states is that marital status
does not affect the ownership of property. The regime is one of separate
property. Each spouse owns all that he or she earns. By contrast, in the
community-property states, each spouse acquires an ownership interest in
half the property the other earns during the marriage. By granting each
spouse upon acquisition an immediate half interest in the earnings of the
other, the community-property regimes directly recognize that the couple's
enterprise is in essence collaborative.
40. Id.
41. Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in Divorce
Reform at the Crossroads 191, 198-99 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990).
42. I use the term "community-property system" to include that version of community law
adopted in the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA), enacted in modified form in
Wisconsin.
43. As noted in W. Reppy, Community Property in California 1 (1980): "The crux of the
community property system . . . is shared ownership by husband and wife of acquisitions
earned by either or both during marriage .... Community property thus extends the notion
of marriage as a partnership to property rights of the spouses."
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The common-law states, however, also give effect or purport to give
effect to the partnership theory when it perhaps counts most-at dissolu-
tion of a marriage upon divorce.44 If the marriage ends in divorce, a spouse
who sacrificed her financial-earning opportunities to contribute so-called
domestic services to the marital enterprise, such as childrearing and
homemaking, or a spouse who pursued a lower-paying career or who
engaged in volunteer work, stands to be recompensed. Almost all states now
follow the so-called equitable-distribution system upon divorce, 45 under
which:
Trial courts enjoy broad discretion to examine the cirucmstances
of each case, acknowledging a nonworking spouse's contributions
to the acquisition of property, and assign the property to either
spouse, irrespective of title. Simply stated, the system of equitable
distribution views marriage as essentially a shared enterprise in
the nature of a partnership to which both spouses contribute-
directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinancially-the fruits
of which are distributable at divorce.46
The other situation in which spousal property rights figure promi-
nently is disinheritance at death. Almost all common-law states hold that
this is one of the few instances in American law in which a decedent's
testamentary freedom with respect to his title-based ownership interests
must be curtailed. No matter what the decedent's intent, the common-law
states recognize that the surviving spouse does possess some claim to a
portion of the decedent's estate. These statutes provide the spouse a
so-called forced share. Because the forced share is expressed as an option
44. In Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974), a landmark case
interpreting New Jersey's equitable-distribution statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated:
The statute we are considering authorizes the courts, upon divorce, to divide
marital assets equitably between the spouses.... mhe enacinent seeks to right what
many have felt to be a grave wrong. It gives recognition to the essential supportive
role played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and
mother 3he should clearly be entitled to a share of family assets accumulated during
the maniage. Thus the division of property upon divorce is responsive to the concept
that marriage is a shared enterprise, ajoint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin
to a partnership. Only if it is clearly understood that far more than economic factors
are involved, will the resulting distribution be equitable within the true intent and
meaning of the statute.... The widely pervasive effect this remedial legislation will
almost certainly have throughout our society betokens its great significance.
Id. at 228-29, 320 A.2d at 501-02. Although in this early equitable-distribution case, the court
refused to establish a presumptive division of marital assets on a fifty/fifty basis, see id. at 232
n.6, 320 A.2d at 503 n.6, many courts today do indulge in such a presumption of equal
division, and many of the more recently enacted statutes explicitly do so. See J. Gregory, The
Law of Equitable Distribution 8.03 (1989).
45. In 1989, Professor Oldham reported that "Mississippi is the only state that has not
clearly accepted (the equitable-distribution] system. See Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574 (Miss.
1988)." Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 Fain. L.Q. 219, 219 n.1
(1989).
For a fascinating account of how this system swept the country, see Glendon, Property
Rights upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, in The Cambridge Lectures 245
(N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds. 1981).
46. J. Gregory, supra note 42, § 1.03, at 1-6 (1989).
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that the survivor can elect or let lapse during the administration of the
decedent's estate, and not as a retitling of the decedent's property that
automatically occurs at death, the UPC uses the more descriptive term
"elective" share.
Elective-share law in the common-law states has not caught up to the
partnership theory of marriage. Under typical American elective-share law,
including the elective share provided by the pre-1990 UPC, a surviving
spouse is granted a right to claim a one-third share of the decedent's estate,
not a right to claim the fifty percent share of the couple's combined assets
that the partnership theory would imply. The redesigned elective share
promulgated in the 1990 UPC is intended to bring elective-share law into
line with the partnership theory of marriage.
To illustrate the discrepancy between the partnership theory and
conventional elective-share law, consider first a long-term marriage in
which the couple's combined assets were accumulated mostly during the
course of the marriage. The conventional elective-share fraction of one-
third of the decedent's estate plainly does not implement a partnership
principle.47 The actual result is governed by which spouse happens to die
first and by how the property accumulated during the marriage was
nominally titled.
Consider Ben and Elaine again. Assume that Ben and Elaine were
married in their twenties or early thirties; they never divorced, and Ben
died somewhat prematurely at age sixty-two. For whatever reason, Ben left
a will entirely disinheriting Elaine. Throughout their long life together, the
couple managed to accumulate assets worth $600,000, making them a
somewhat affluent but hardly wealthy couple.
Under conventional elective-share law, Elaine's ultimate entitlement is
governed by the manner in which these $600,000 in assets were nominally
titled as between them. Elaine could end up much poorer or much richer
than a fifty-fifty principle suggests. The reason is that under conventional
elective-share law, Elaine has a claim to one-third of Ben's "estate."
When the marital assets were disproportionately titled in the dece-
dent's name, conventional elective-share law often entities the survivor to
less than an equal share. Thus, if Ben "owned" all $600,000 of the marital
assets, Elaine's claim against Ben's estate is only for $200,000, well below
Elaine's $300,000 entitlement produced by the partnership principle. If
Ben "owned" $500,000 of the marital assets, Elaine's claim against Ben's
estate is only for $166,500 (one-third of $500,000), which when combined
with Elaine's "own" $100,000 yields a less than equal share of $266,500 for
Elaine, a figure still below the $300,000 produced by the partnership or
marital-sharing principle.
When, on the other hand, the marital assets were more or less equally
divided, conventional elective-share law grants the survivor a right to take
47. Nor does a less conventional elective-share fraction of one-half, as is in effect in a small
number of states. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-11-201 (1987). A one-half share of the
decedent's assets whenever and however acquired is not the equivalent of a true or
hypothesized one-half share of the couple's assets acquired during the marriage other than by
gift or inheritance.
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a disproportionately large share. If Ben and Elaine each owned $300,000,
Elaine is still granted a claim against Ben's estate for an additional
$100,000.
Finally, when the marital assets were disproportionately titled in the
survivor's name, conventional elective-share law entitles the survivor to
magnify the disproportion. If only $200,000 were titled in Ben's name,
Elaine still has a claim against Ben's estate for $66,667 (one-third of
$200,000), even though Elaine is already overcompensated as measured by
the partnership or marital-sharing theory.
Let us now look at a very different sort of marriage-a short-term
marriage, particularly the short-term marriage later in life, in which each
spouse typically comes into the marriage with assets derived from a former
marriage. In these marriages, the one-third fraction of the decedent's estate
far exceeds a fifty-fifty division of assets acquired during the marriage.
To illustrate this sort of marriage, let us return to the case of Elaine
and Carl. Remember that a few years after Ben's death, Elaine married
Carl. Suppose that both Elaine and Carl were in their mid-to-late sixties
when the), married. Then suppose that after a few years of marriage, Elaine
died survived by Carl. Assume further that both Elaine and Carl have adult
children and a few grandchildren by their respective prior marriages, and
that each naturally would prefer to leave most or all of his or her property
to those respective biological children. So, let us work through the
numbers. The value of the couple's combined assets is $600,000, $300,000
of which is titled in Elaine's name and $300,000 of which is titled in Carl's
name.
Under conventional elective-share law, Carl has a claim to one-third of
Elaine's estate, or $100,000. For reasons that are not immediately apparent,
conventional elective-share law gives the survivor, Carl, a right to shrink
Elaine's estate, and hence the share of Elaine's children by her prior
marriage to Ben, by $100,000, while supplementing Carl's assets, which will
likely go to Carl's children by his prior marriage, by $100,000. Conventional
elective-share law, in other words, basically rewards the children of the
remarried spouse who manages to outlive the other, arranging for those
children a windfall share of one-third of the "loser's" estate. The "winning"
spouse-the one who chanced to survive-gains a windfall, for this person
is unlikely to have made a contribution, monetary or otherwise, to the
"loser's" wealth remotely worth one-third.
How prevalent is remarriage later in life ending in the death of one of
the partners a few years later? Plainly, such marriages do not affect a high
proportion of the widowed and divorced population. Nevertheless, govern-
ment data suggest that the incidence of such marriages may not be
insignificant. 48
48. Data published by the federal government reveal that, within the widowed and
divorced population at large, not disaggregated by age, about 21 percent of widowed men and
about 8 percent of widowed women remarry; and about 83 percent of divorced men and 78
percent of divorced women remarry. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, supra note 3,
at 12. The average (mean) ages at time of remarriage of widowed men and women has
increased steadily, to 60.2 for men and 52.6 for women in 1983, the latest year for which
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Equally relevant to the point, when such marriages occur, conven-
tional elective-share law renders results that are dramatically inconsistent
with the partnership theory of marriage. That the children of the dece-
dent's former marriage see these results as unjust is both unsurprising and
well documented in the elective-share case law.49 Recognize, then, that in a
short-term, late-in-life marriage which produces no children, a decddent
who disinherits or largely disinherits the surviving spouse may not be acting
so much from malice or spite toward the surviving spouse, but from a
perceived higher obligation to the children of his or her former, long-term
marriage.
The redesigned elective-share system incorporated in the 1990 UPC
responds to these concerns by moving elective-share law into line with the
partnership theory of marriage.
In the long-term marriage, illustrated by the marriage of Ben and
Elaine, the effect of implementing a partnership theory is to increase the
entitlement of the surviving spouse when the marital assets were dispro-
portionately tidled in the decedent's name, and to decrease or even
eliminate the entitlement of the surviving spouse when the marital assets
were more or less equally tidled or disproportionately tided in the surviving
spouse's name. Put differently, the effect is both to reward the surviving
spouse who sacrificed his or her financial-earning opportunities in order to
statistics have been published, up from 57.7 for men and 50.3 for women in 1970. The average
(mean) age at remarriage of divorced men and women also has steadily increased, but the ages
are much lower. The average (mean) ages for 1983 are 37.3 for men and 33.7 for women, up
from 36.7 for men and 32.8 for women in 1970. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., supra
note 3, Table 4, at 24.
In 1983, the average intervals between becoming widowed and remarrying for the
65-and-older age group were 3.6 years for men and 7.9 years for women. The average
intervals between divorce and remarriage for the same age group were 6.3 years for men and
10.4 years for women. Id. at 13.
Within the 65-years-and-older population, 2.62% of divorced men and .049% of divorced
women remarried during 1983. During that same year, the remarriage rate of widowed men
and women age 65 and older was 1.68% for men and .019% for women. Within the divorced
population ages 60 to 64 for that same year, 4.93% of divorced men and 1.29% of divorced
women remarried; figures were not given for the widowed population ages 60 to 64 for that
or any other year. The remarriage rates within the 65-and-older divorced and widowed
segments of the population have been trending downward, but not in a straight line. The data
show peaks and valleys over the course of the 1970-83 period. The peak occurred during the
year 1975, when 3.14% of divorced men, .091 of divorced women, 1.95% of widowed men,
and .021% of widowed women remarried. Id., Table 3, at 23. These remarriage rates, of
course, do not reveal the remarriage rates of divorced or widowed men and women age 65 and
older or age 60 to 64; they merely reveal the remarriage rates for a given year. Because such
remarriages accumulate within the population, the incidence of remarriage later in life
appears to be significant.
49. See W. MacDonald, Fraud on the Widow's Share 156-57 (Michigan Legal Studies
1960). Of the elective-share cases in the law reports up to the time of writing and in which the
author could identify the relationships, more than half pitted children of a former marriage
against a later spouse.
Statistically, "on average, women ending first marriages had 1.06 children under 18 years,
and those ending second marriages had 0.64 children, and those ending third marriages had
0.36 children. These differences are due at least in part to the fact that most children are born
into first marriages and may not be mentioned on divorce records of subsequent marriages
unless custody becomes an issue." U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., supra note 3, at 3.
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contribute so-called domestic services to the marital enterprise and to deny
an additional windfall to the surviving spouse in whose name the fruits of
a long-term marriage were mostly titled.
In the short-term, later-in-life marriage, the effect of implementing a
partnership theory is to decrease or even eliminate the windfall entitlement
of the spouse who chanced to survive, for in such a marriage, neither
spouse is likely to have contributed much, if anything, to the acquisition of
the other's wealth. The partnership theory denies a windfall to the survivor
who contributed little to the decedent's wealth and, ultimately, denies a
windfall to the survivor's children by a prior marriage at the expense of the
decedent's children by a prior marriage. In hardship cases, however, the
surviving spouse receives a special supplemental elective-share amount
when he or she would otherwise be left without sufficient funds for
support.53
Because ease of administration and predictability of result are prized
features of the probate system, implementing the partnership or marital-
sharing theory proved to be a challenging undertaking. In the judgment of
the UPG drafters, neither model provided by existing law-the equitable-
distribution system provided by divorce law or the community-property
system allocating ownership of marital property equally between the
spouses-seemed appropriate as a basis for adapting forced-share law to
noncommunity-property states.
2. An Equitable-Distribution Elective Share?
Modeling the elective share on divorce law appeared to the UPC
drafters to be quite unsatisfactory. The strongest argument for extending
divorce law to disinheritance at death is that of parallelism. Disinheritance
of a spouse at death resembles divorce, the argument goes, because the
marriage has failed and terminated. 51 There are several objections to this
analogy. One is that disinheritance at death-especially in the late-in-life
marriage-need not be the mark of a failed marriage. Disinheritance of
such a spouse might be motivated by the decedent's sense that he or she has
a higher obligation to his or her biological children by a prior marriage,
especially if the disinherited spouse has ample independent means of
support. Conventional law, of course, allows such a surviving spouse to take
an elective share of the decedent's estate anyway, or to be prevailed upon by
his or her children by a prior marriage to do so.
Nor is the goal of parity between regimes of marital property division
on divorce and death compatible with a uniform laws project striving to
achieve uniformity within the probate system. Although all or almost all
states now follow the so-called equitable-distribution system upon divorce,
there is considerable variation among the states in the details, large and
small, of implementing that system. There is not one, uniformly accepted
50. The supplemental elective-share feature, established by section 2-201(b), is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
51. Comment, Spousal Disinheritance: The New York Solution-A Critique of Forced
Share Legislation, 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 881, 903-07 (1985) (advocating the adoption of the
equitable ditribution approach).
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equitable-distribution system; there are several. 52 The systems vary with
respect to the type of property that is subject to equitable distribution, and
they take into account different factors in deciding how to divide that
property. Professor Oldham has identified three major types of equitable-
distribution systems: 53 (1) the "kitchen sink" system, in which all property
of the two spouses, regardless of how or when acquired, is subject to
division;54 (2) the "marital property" system, which excludes "separate" or
"individual" property-that is, property acquired by either spouse before
the marriage and property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
by gift or inheritance; and (3) the "hybrid" system, in which separate or
individual property is presumptively excluded from division, but could be
reached when exclusion would be "unfair." Further variations within each "
broad category are recognized.
If parity with the regime of marital property both in divorce and in
dissolution on death is the goal, a uniform laws project that aspires to a
single regime for dissolution on death cannot track the multiplicity of
regimes on divorce. The logic of the argument for parity is that within each
state the method of property division upon divorce and upon disinheri-
tance at death must be identical. The logic of a uniform laws project dealing
with probate law is that each state will adopt the same elective-share system,
particularly in order to prevent a spouse bent on disinheritance from
domicile shopping by relocating property to a state with fewer safeguards
against this sort of behavior.
Quite apart from concerns about the difficulty of implementing parity
between elective-share law and equitable-distribution law, the discretionary
aspect of equitable-distribution law makes it inappropriate for an elective-
share system. Under equitable distribution, once the property subject to
division is identified, the practice is not to divide that property by applying
a flat fraction, fifty-fifty or whatever, but to weigh various factors in
determining how that property is to be divided, often (but not always)
including "misconduct" or "fault" of each party-such as adultery, violence,
excessive drinking, sexual neglect, mental cruelty, 55 -and other subjective
criteria. 56 When death terminates the marriage, only the surviving spouse
52. The various schemes are canvassed, state-by-state, in L. Golden, Equitable Distribu-
tion of Property §§ 2.01-2.03 (1983) (discussing the dual property system, the all property
system, and the special equity system); J. Gregory, The Law of Equitable Distribution A1-A81
(1989) (excerpting relevant statutes from all 50 states); G. McLellan, Equitable Distribution
Law and Practice §§ 6.1-.12 (1985) (discussing no statute jurisdiction, community property
jurisdiction, all property jurisdiction, and excluded property jurisdictions); J. Oldham,
Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property (1989).
53. J. Oldham, supra note 52, at § 3.03; see also McKnight, Defining Property Subject to
Division at Divorce, 23 Fam. L.Q. 193 (1989) (discussing the process each state uses in
equitable division of property).
54. ButseeJ. Oldham, supra note 52, at § 13.0211][i] (notingjudicial reluctance to divide
property acquired before the marriage or during the marriage by gift or inheritance "unless
the circumstances warrant").
55. SeeJ. Gregory, supra note 52, at para. 9.03. In Brown v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 528, 529
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986), for example, fault was shown by, among other things, evidence that the
wife "talked to [the husband] like he was dirt, hurt his feelings, made him nervous."
56. The factors are discussed inJ. Gregory, supra note 52, at ch. 8;J. Oldham, supra note
52, at § 13.02-.03. Professor McKnight reports that "[a]s many as thirty-eight factors have
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can testify as to certain types or instances of misconduct or fault, making
consideration of factors such as these seem unfair to the decedent's side. In
addition, whether or not the state's laundry list of factors includes fault or
misconduct, the exact weight to be given each included factor is not
prescribed. Because each case is handled on an ad hoc basis,57 equitable
distribution is in truth "discretionary distribution." 58 The following analysis
of Professors Kwestel and Seplowitz sums up many of the reasons for not
carrying equitable-distribution law into the elective share:
[A]n equitable distribution model, which entails a case-by-case
determination based upon.., subjective criteria, is not appropri-
ate in the elective share area, which has traditionally involved
different concerns and in which predictability and ease of admin-
istration are important goals. Furthermore, use of an equitable
distribution model would significantly impede the development of
a comprehensive estate plan and, more importantly, would prob-
ably provide no greater protection for the surviving spouse .... 59
been identified that may be considered in equitable distribution [citing Note, 50 Fordham L.
Rev. 415, 439 n.170 (1981)]." McKnight, supra pote 53, at 197 n.14.
57. One commentator describes the equitable distribution process as follows:
Most equitable distribution statutes set out a list of factors that a court must
consider when distributing property. In a few jurisdictions where the statutes do not
contain factors, appellate courts have developed and articulated them for the
guidance of the trial courts. At the same time, it is abundantly clear that no particular
factors are intended to be more important than any others. In the final analysis,
judicial discretion is the hallmark of equitable distribution.
A much debated point among lawyers, legislators, and others engaged in drafting
equitable distribution legislation is whether equal division is most equitable. The
question is far from resolved and perhaps never will be. In a small minority of
jurisdict ons, the statutes contain a presumption of equal division of marital property.
In a few others, the courts have created a fifty-fifty starting point for division, even
while rejecting a presumption of equal division. Some states reject altogether both
presumptions and starting points.
J. Gregory, supra note 52, at § 8.01. See also J. Oldham, supra note 52, at § 13.02[2] (noting
and lamenting the arbitrary results produced by giving trial courts such great discretion).
58. Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553, 1556 (1984).
The discretionary characteristic of equitable-distribution law resembles the probate-law
system that prevails in England and the Commonwealth, called Testator's Family Maintenance
(TFM). TFM empowers a judge to vary the testator's will in order "to make reasonable
financial provision" for the surviving spouse. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Depen-
dents) Act 1975, Halsbury's Stat. ch. 63, § 1. In making this determination, the court can
weigh the competing equities of the children of a prior marriage; the adequacy of the spouse's
own res.ources; the spouse's age; and "the duration of the marriage." Id. at §§ 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a).
TFM remits to judicial discretion every important issue of policy in forced-share law. For a
lucid critique of TFM, see Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law
and Succession Law, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1165"(1986).
The discretionary characteristic of equitable-distribution law surely contributes to the high
rate of private settlement in divorce cases, estimated to be about 90%. See Am. L. Inst.,
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 8 (Prelim. Draft
No. 1, 1990); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 Yale L.J. 950,
970 n.64 (1979).
59. Kwestel & Seplowitz, Testamentary Substitutes-A Time for Statutory Clarification,
23 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 467, 472 n.22 (1988).
HeinOnline  -- 76 Iowa L. Rev. 244 1990-1991
SPOUSAL RIGHTS UNDER THE REVISED UPC
3. A Deferred Community-Property Elective Share?
The other model from existing law that might have been used to
implement a partnership or marital-sharing theory is the community-
property system. As noted before, under community-property law, each
spouse automatically acquires a half interest in property, other than a gift
or inheritance, as it is acquired during the marriage. There are two possible
approaches for injecting community-property law into the legislative
scheme of the noncommunity-property states on a deferred-until-death
basis, and it is not always clear which of the two approaches is advocated by
those proposing it.60 One approach, which I call the strict deferred-
community approach, automatically retities the couple's property upon the
decedent's death, giving both the surviving spouse and the decedent
spouse's estate an automatic half interest in that portion of the couple's
property (however titied during the course of the marriage) that would
have been community property had they lived their married life in a
community-property jurisdiction.61 The other approach, which I call the
elective-share deferred-community approach, gives the surviving spouse
(but not the decedent spouse's estate) a right to elect that same portion of
the couple's property.62
The elective-share deferred-community approach is considerably
more promising as a model for implementing the partnership or marital-
sharing theory than equitable-distribution law.63 Interestingly, most of the
community-property states themselves recognize a difference between
termination of a marriage by divorce and termination by death of one of the
spouses. The discretionary equitable-distribution system is used for
divorce, 64 but the mechanical community-property fifty-fifty split is used at
60. See Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be Retained?, 38 Case W.
Res. 223, 245-47 (1987) (without discussing the strict deferred-community approach, author
seems to accept the elective-share deferred-community approach).
61. An analogue to this approach exists in the community-property states of California
and Washington. These states apply a strict deferred-community approach to the case of
"quasi-community" property. The quasi-community property concept addresses the problems
of "migratory" married couples; it treats property acquired elsewhere that would have been
characterized as community property under the community regime as quasi-community
property. In California and Washington, such property is automatically retitled at death,
hence invoking a strict deferred-community approach. Cal. Prob. Code § 101 (Supp. 1989);
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.16.220-.250 (Supp. 1989).
62. An analogue to this approach exists in the community-property States of Idaho and
Wisconsin, with respect to quasi-community property. For an explanation of quasi-community
property, see supra note 61. These states give a surviving spouse a right to elect to take a half
share of the couple's quasi-community property, hence invoking an elective-share deferred-
community approach. Idaho Code §§ 15-2-101 to -209 (1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 851.055,
861.02 (West Supp. 1989).
63. As between the strict and elective-share deferred-community approaches, the strict
approach is more consistent with the marital-sharing theory, but the elective-share approach
is more consistent with the notion of an elective share in the common-law states. See infra note
76.
64. See J. Oldham, supra note 52, at § 3.03[5J ("In a few community property states,
community property must be divided equally. [Citing Cal. Civ. Code § 4800 (1983)]. Most of
these states, however, permit an equitable division of the community estate. [Citing Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 25-318 (1976); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.180 (1987); Tex. Fam. Code § 3.63
(1975)]."). See alho Reppy, Major Events in the Evolution of American Community Property
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death. In the probate area, the attractive feature of community law is its
predetermined formula. That portion of the couple's property acquired
during the marriage, other than by gift or inheritance, is divided according
to a strict fifty-fifty ratio; other factors are excluded. In terms of the
contribution theory, the premise upon which community law can be said to
rest is that of an irrebuttable presumption that each spouse contributed
equally to the acquisition of the couple's wealth. 65 The argument for a
mechanical as opposed to a discretionary formula for determining contri-
bution was recently stated in these terms:
[Elective-share] law could, in theory, open [the question of
contribution] to examination of the merits in each case, but it has
not, and for good reason. The proofs would be extraordinarily
difficult. The issues in such a case would not resemble the issues
in ordinary fact-finding-issues such as whether the traffic light
was green or red. Examining the true merits of the case under [an
elective]-share system that tried to establish the spouses's actual
contributions to the family wealth would necessarily entail an
inquiry into virtually every facet of the spouses's conduct through-
out the marriage. Further, that litigation would arise just when
death has sealed the lips of the most affected party. These are the
concerns that have in the past led American policymakers to
prefer a mechanical elective-share system over [a discretionary]
system. 66
Unlike the equitable-distribution model, the fact that the community-
property systems vary from state to state with respect to details such as
whether income earned during the marriage on separate property becomes
community property or remains separate does not pose a problem. No one
would propose an elective share based on a deferred-until-death
community-property model for adoption in the community-property
states; lack of parity would therefore not be a difficulty. If a deferred
community-property elective-share were to be proposed, it would be for
adoption in the noncommunity-property states. Consequently, the varia-
tions in the details of community law that exist within the community-
property states could easily be resolved by embracing one method on each
of the subsidiary issues upon which there is variation.
67
Law and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 Fain. L.Q. 163, 164 (1989).
65. Stated in terms of the marital-sharing or partnership theory, the analysis is that the
couple's implied bargain upon entering marriage is one of equal splitting of the proceeds of
the marriage, unless the couple opts out of the implied bargain by entering into a premarital
or postmarital agreement.
66. Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 Real Prop. Prob.
& Tr.J. 303, 320.21 (1987).
67. Had we decided to adopt a deferred-community forced share, subsidiary questions
such as whether income generated by and appreciation in value of separate property during
the marriage are marital or separate property would undoubtedly have been resolved in
accordance with the rules provided in the Uniform Marital Property Act. For a discussion of
these issues under the various community and equitable-distribution regimes, see Wenig, The
Increase of Value of Separate Property During Marriage: Examination and Proposals, 23 Fain.
L.Q. 301 (1989).
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If lack of parity is not a problem, why then did the UPC drafters not
adopt a deferred-community elective share? The perceived drawback was
the tracing-to-source and other problems associated with classification. 68 A
deferred-community elective share would require identifying which of the
couple's assets were acquired during the marriage and which assets were
brought in at the time of the marriage or acquired during the marriage by
gift or inheritance. The classification problem is arguably more difficult in
noncommunity-property states than in community-property states because
couples in the former are not put on notice as to the risk involved in not
maintaining good records. The problem is commingling.
6 9
To be sure, the administrative burden could be eased by adopting a
presumption that all spousal property is community property. Such a
presumption would ease the administrative burden, but at the cost of
reaching incorrect results in cases in which the presumption would prevail
not because it is correct, but because sufficient contrary evidence cannot be
obtained.70 Thus, what appears to be an exact method may not in fact give
exact results.
4. The Method Adopted: An Accrual-Type Elective-Share System
To avoid the classification conundrum, which can plunge the parties
and trier of the facts into a tracing-to-source pursuit, the UPC drafters
decided to implement the marital-partnership theory by means of a
mechanically determined approximation system, which the drafters call an
accrual-type elective share.7 ' Under the accrual-type elective share, there is
no need to identify which of the couple's property was earned during the
marriage and which was acquired prior to the marriage or acquired during
the marriage by gift or inheritance.
The UPC's accrual-type elective share, which, on the unanimous
recommendation of its Executive Board, has been endorsed by the Assem-
68. For a discussion of tracing-to-source and associated classification problems in
equitable-distribution law, see Oldham, supra note 45; Kessler, Transmutation, Wisconsin
Lawyer 13 (Aug. 1990); Popp v. Popp, 146 Wis. 2d 778,432 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
69. See M. Glendon, supra note 27, at 124 (Even title-based systems are "not always simple
in practical application .... Complexity creeps in because in most households the assets of the
spouses tend to be mingled rather than kept separate or neatly earmarked."); see also Popp 146
Wis. 2d at 778, 432 N.W.2d at 600; Oldham, supra note 45; Kessler, supra note 68.
Jane Bryant Quinn, the columnist, has written that married couples divide into two
categories-"poolers" and "splitters." Poolers put all their earnings into a single, marital
account; savings, investments, and the house are held jointly. Even inheritances tend to
straggle toward the common pot. Splitters keep their money separate. The longer splitters are
married, the more they edge towards forms of pooling. Quinn, Marriage and Money-
Keeping the Peace, Woman's Day, June 16, 1987, at 18.
70. See Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 Fain. L.Q. 147, 152-53
(1989) (noting, in the context of equitable-distribution law, that "the stronger the presumption
[in favor of characterizing all property as marital property], the less likely it will be that the
spouse who owned nonmarital property at marriage or received some during the marriage will
try to trace the property or funds;" and that the weaker the presumption, the more likely it will
be that tracing issues will be litigated).
71. For a proposal that divorce law utilize an accrual-type system for division of assets, see
Sugarman, Dividing the Financial Interests on Divorce, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads
130, 159-60 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990).
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bly of the National Association of Women Lawyers (NAWL), 72 has three
essential features. The first, implemented by section 2- 201 (a), establishes a
schedule under which the elective share adjusts to the length of the
marriage. The longer the marriage, the larger the "elective-share percent-
age." The "elective-share percentage" is initially small and increases annu-
ally according to a graduated schedule until reaching a maximum rate of
fifty percent. Specifically, the schedule starts by providing the surviving
spouse, during the first year of marriage, a right to elect the "supplemental
elective-share amount"7 only. After five years of marriage, the surviving
spouse's "elective-share percentage" is fifteen percent of the augmented
estate; after ten years of marriage, the share is thirty percent; and after
fifteen years of marriage, the share reaches the maximum level of fifty
percent.
74
The second feature of the UPC's redesigned system is that the
"elective-share percentage" is applied to the value of the "augmented
estate," as defined in section 2-202(a). The augmented estate includes the
couple's combined assets, not merely the value of the assets nominally titled
in the decedent's name. The application of the "elective-share percentage"
to the "augmented estate" yields the "elective-share amount"-the amount
to which the surviving spouse is entitled. Inclusion in the "augmented
estate" of the couple's combined assets is absolutely essential for the system
to implement a marital-sharing theory. If the elective-share percentage
were to be applied only to the decedent's assets, a surviving spouse who has
already been overcompensated because of the manner that the couple's
marital as:sets have been nominally titled would receive a further windfall
under the elective-share system. The couple's marital assets, in other words,
would not be equalized. By applying the elective-share percentage to the
couple's combined assets, the UPC's redesigned elective-share system
denies any significance to the possibly fortuitous factor of how the spouses
have taken title to particular assets.
The third feature implemented by section 2-207 is that the surviving
spouse's own assets are counted first 75 when determining the spouse's
ultimate entitlement, so that the decedent's assets are liable only to make up
72. Letter from the President of NAWL, Gail McKnight Beckman, to the author (August
14, 1990). It has also been endorsed by the West Virginia Law Institute for enactment in West
Virginia. See Fisher & Curnette, Reforming the Law of Intestate Succession and Elective
Shares: New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W.Va. L. Rev. 61, 65 (1990).
73. For an explanation of the supplemental elective-share amount established by §
2-201(b), see infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
74. Unhke the short-term marriage between Elaine and Carl, a certain fraction of
later-in-life marriages will endure for 15 or more years, giving the surviving spouse the right
to an elective-share percentage of 50%, or will endure for a period not substantially less than
15 years, giving the surviving spouse the right to a near-50 % elective-share percentage. As
reported supra at note 48, the average (mean) age at the time of remarriage of widowed men
who remarry is 60.2 and of widowed women who remarry is 52.6. Given that average life
expectancy at birth is 72 years for men and 78.8 years for women, U.S. D2p't of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States-1990, at Table No. 106 at 74 (110th ed. 1990),
remarriages that take place at ages 60.2 and 52.6, respectively, easily can endure for the
required 15-year period in order to reach the maximum 50% elective-share percentage.
75. Or a portion of them in under-fifteen-year marriages, as explained infra note 79.
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the deficiency, if any. To illustrate these three features, we will examine the
cases of Ben and Elaine and Elaine and Carl.
Remember that Ben and Elaine were married a long time, well beyond
the fifteen-year mark, and that Ben died at age seventy, survived by Elaine.
Remember also that, for whatever reason, Ben left a will entirely disinher-
iting Elaine.76 And, remember that the value of the couple's combined
assets was $600,000.
77
Under the redesigned elective share, the survivor's entitlement in a
marriage of this length would have reached the fifty percent mark well
before Ben's death. Unlike previous elective-share statutes, the UPC's
redesigned elective share disregards how these combined assets were
nominally tided as between Ben and Elaine. For purposes of the redesigned
elective share, the assets are not regarded as partly belonging to Ben and
partly to Elaine. Under the marital-sharing theory of the redesigned
system, half the value of those assets "belongs" to the surviving spouse,
Elaine, if she chooses to claim that amount by making an election.
Of course, in calculating the amount of Elaine's claim on Ben's estate,
it does matter how the $600,000 in assets was nominally tided between
them. When the marital assets were disproportionately tided in the
decedent's name, the- UPC's redesigned elective-share system gives the
survivor a right to equalize them. If Ben "owned" -all $600,000 of the
marital assets, and Elaine "owned" nothing, Elaine's claim against Ben's
estate would be for $300,000. If Ben "owned" $500,000 of the marital assets
and Elaine "owned" $100,000 of them, Elaine's claim against Ben's estate
would be for $200,000, which is the amount necessary to bring Elaine's
$100,000 of assets up to the $300,000 level.
When title to marital assets .was already nearly equally divided, the
UPC's redesigned elective-share system prevents the survivor from taking a
disproportionately large share. Thus, if $300,000 of the marital assets were
titled in Ben's name, and $300,000 were titled in Ylaine's name, Elaine
would have no claim against Ben's estate. Elaine's title-based ownership
rights would already have sufficiently rewarded her, as measured by the
partnership or marital-sharing theory.
When the marital assets were disproportionately titled in the survivor's
name, the redesigned elective-share system prevents the survivor from
magnifying the disparity. If Ben "owned" $200,000 and Elaine "owned"
$400,000, Elaine would have no additional claim against Ben's estate.
78
76. This example assumes that Ben entirely disinherited Elaine, i.e., that nothing passed
to Elaine by testate or intestate succession, nor by nonprobate transfers, such as life insurance
or by right of survivorship under a joint tenancy or a joint bank account. If any property does
pass to Elaine by any of these methods, § 2-207(a)(1) provides that these assets count first
toward making up Elaine's elective-share entitlement.
77. Note that under the UPC's "augmented-estate" system, the couple's combined assets
extend well beyond the so-called probate assets and include such items as the couple's home
(even if held in joint tenancy), life insurance, and pension benefits. See UPC § 2-202(b)(2)
(1990).
78. Notice that the redesigned system does not seek to equalize the marital assets in this
case by giving Ben's estate a claim to a portion of Elaine's property. Under the redesigned
system, as noted in the text, Elaine has no claim against Ben's estate because she already has
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Now, let us turn to Elaine and Carl. Remember that a few years after
Ben's death, Elaine married Carl. Both Elaine and Carl were in their
mid-to-late sixties, and after about five years of marriage Elaine died
survived by Carl. Both Elaine and Carl had adult children and a few
grandchildren by their prior marriages.
The previous discussion of this example showed how the
conventional-type elective-share law gives the surviving spouse the power
to siphon off a share of the decedent's estate without justification under the
marital-sharing principle. Let us now see how Carl and ultimately his
children by his prior marriage fare under the UPC's redesigned system.
Recall that the value of the couple's combined assets was $600,000, of which
$300,000 was titled in Elaine's name and $300,000 was titled in Carl's name.
Because the marriage lasted about five years, the elective-share percentage
is fifteen percent.
Although Carl's elective-share entitlement is $90,000 (fifteen percent
of $600,000), this does not mean that Carl has a $90,000 claim against
Elaine's estate. Thirty percent of Carl's own $300,000 in assets (double the
been disproportionately compensated as judged by the marital-sharing principle. This is in
contrast to conventional elective-share law, under which Elaine could magnify the dispropor-
tion by claiming an additional $66,667.
One might argue that the redesigned system ought to have given Ben's estate a claim against
Elaine's property. But giving his estate such a claim is inconsistent with the notion of an
elective-share system. Noncommunity-property states have traditionally viewed the elective
share as an entitlement for the personal benefit of the surviving spouse, not for the benefit of
the beneficiaries of a decedent spouse's estate. For this reason, the UPG's redesigned
elective-share system does not recognize the partnership or marital-sharing interest of the
decedent spouse. Also for this reason, in cases of simultaneous or near-simultaneous deaths,
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act and the UPC's version of that Act, which requires
survivorship of the decedent by 120 hours, do not invoke a partnership theory, but rather
provide for the disposition of each spouse's property to that spouse's beneficiaries. See UPG
§ 2-104 (1993) (too subsidiary to include in appendb:).
The community-property system does protect the decedent's interest as well as the survivor's
interest, and in this respect the redesigned elective share differs from the community-property
system. A similar mutuality in noncommunity elective-share law would require granting to the
estate of the deceased spouse a claim against the assets of the surviving spouse. Such a right
of election would have to devolve to the decedent's personal representative, where it would
resemble somewhat the situation in current law in which a fiduciary makes the election on
behalf of a surviving spouse who is incompetent.
Administratively, there are at least two ways of handling the situation. One is to authorize
the decedent spouse's personal representative to make the election. Because the decedent
spouse's personal representative owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the spouse's
estate, the election would become virtually automatic when not waived by a well-drafted
instrument. This contrasts with the present situation in which the elective share is actually
exercised only rarely, in cases of deliberate disinheritance of the survivor. The other way of
handling the situation is to authorize the decedent spouse's personal representative to make an
election only if the spouse's will or some other legal document authorizes the election. The
second approach is less objectionable than the first because it would reduce the number of
elections. But even this approach would necessitate extension of the cumbersome elective-
share apparatus, not only to cases in which the less wealthy spouse predeceases the other by
a clear or substantial margin, but also to cases of simultaneous and near-simultaneous deaths.
More importantly, this approach does not square with the traditional notion that the elective
share is for the personal benefit of the surviving spouse. Thus, the redesigned system leaves
the parties where they are in this situation, providing neither with a claim against the other's
assets.
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elective-share percentage of fifteen percent) counts in fulfillment of Carl's
elective-share amount.7 9 Since thirty percent of Carl's assets is $90,000,
there is no deficiency, and hence no claim to any of Elaine's assets. And,
there should properly be none.80
5. Other Elective Share Features
a. The Support Theo7y
The partnership or marital-sharing theory is not the only force driving
elective-share law. Another theoretical basis for elective-share law is that the
spouses' mutual duties of support during their joint lifetimes should be
continued in some form after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on
the decedent's estate. Conventional elective-share law implements this
theory poorly. The fixed fraction, whether it is the typical one-third or
some other fraction, disregards the survivor's actual need. A one-third
share may be inadequate to the surviving spouse's needs, especially in a
79. Under § 2-207(a)(4) of the redesigned system, the portion of the surviving spouse's
assets that counts toward making up the elective-share amount is derived by applying a
percentage to the survivor's assets equal to double the elective- share percentage. In the case
of Elaine and Carl, the elective- share percentage is 15%, which means that 30% of Carl's assets
are counted first toward making up the elective-share amount.
To explain why this is appropriate requires further elaboration of the underlying theory of
the UPC's redesigned system. The system avoids the tracing-to-source problem by applying an
ever-increasing percentage to the couple's combined assets without regard to when or how
those assets were acquired, rather than applying a constant percentage (50%) to an ever-
growing level of assets. By approximation, the redesigned system equates the elective-share
percentage of the couple's combined assets with 50% of the couple's marital assets-assets
subject to equalization under the marital-sharing theory. Thus, in a marriage like that of
Elaine and Carl, which endured long enough for the elective-share percentage to be 15%, the
redesigned system equates 15% of the couple's combined assets with 50% of those assets that
were acquired during the marriage other than by gift or inheritance. In the aggregate, the
system counts 30% ($180,000) of the couple's $600,000 in combined assets as assets acquired
during the marriage other than by gift or inheritance.
The redesigned system applies the same ratio to the asset mix of each spouse as it does to
the couple's combined assets. To say that the elective-share percentage is 15% means that the
combined assets are treated as being in a 30/70 ratio (30% marital, subject to equalization; 70%
individual, exempted from equalization). This same ratio, in turn, governs the approximation
of each spouse's mix of marital and individual property. Consequently, the redesigned system
attributes 30% of Elaine's $300,000 ($90,000) to marital property and the other 70%
($210,000) to individual property. And, the system does the same for Carl's $300,000, i.e., it
treats 30% ($90,000) as marital property and 70% ($210,000) as individual property.
Accordingly, Carl is treated as already owning $90,000 of the $180,000 of marital property.
Or, to say this in elective-share terminology, $90,000 of Carl's $90,000 elective-share amount
comes from Carl's own assets, giving Carl the right to claim nothing from Elaine's net probate
estate. Remember that $90,000 of Elaine's assets are attributed to marital property; thus, each
partner already owned his or her respective 50% share of the marital-property component of
their combined assets.
80. Note, however, that although in this last example the redesigned system gave Carl no
daim against Elaine's assets, there is an additional safeguard built into the system. As
explained next, the redesigned system has another prong-the support-theory prong. Bear in
mind that in the example we just discussed, if the dollar values were much lower, Carl would
have a claim against Elaine's estate to be brought up to the $50,000 level in addition to the
claim for $43,000 in probate exemptions and allowances. These rights apply regardless of the
length of the marriage.
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modest estate. On the other hand, in a very large estate, it may go far
beyond the survivor's needs. In either a modest or a large estate, the
survivor may or may not have ample independent means, and this factor,
too, is disregarded in conventional elective-share law.
The UPC's redesigned elective-share system seeks to .implement the
support theory by granting the survivor a supplemental elective-share
amount related to the survivor's actual needs.81 In implementing a support
rationale, the length of the marriage is quite irrelevant. Because the duty of
support is founded upon status, it arises at the time of the marriage.
Section 2-201 (b) of the revised UPC implements the support theory by
providing a supplemental elective-share amount of $50,000.82 Counted
first in making up this $50,000 amount are the surviving spouse's own
titled-based ownership interests, including amounts shifting to the survivor
at the decedent's death and amounts owing to the survivor from the
decedent's estate under the accrual-type elective-share apparatus discussed
above, but excluding amounts going to the survivor under the Code's
probate exemptions and allowances and the survivor's Social Security and
other governmental benefits. Under section 2-207(b) and (c), if the survi-
vor's asset, are less than the $50,000 minimum, then the survivor is entitled
to whatever additional portion of the decedent's estate is necessary, up to
one-hundred percent of it, to bring the survivor's assets up to the minimum
level. In the case of a late marriage, the minimum figure plus the probate
exemptions and allowances, which under the Code amount to a minimum
of another $43,000, in conjunction with Social Security payments, which in
1990 could reach $975 a month for a retired worker or for a nondisabled
widow or widower of a retired worker, and other governmental benefits,
provide the survivor with a fairly adequate means of support.8 3
81. This support feature responds to an objection to the marital-partnership theory as
applied to divorce law, which is that it sometimes leaves certain categories of divorced woman
without sufficient funds for support. See L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The
Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America ch. 7
(1985); Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in Divorce
Reform at the Crossroads 191, 201-04 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990); Smith, The
Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 689 (1990). For
criticism of the Weitzman study, see Sugarman, supra note 71, at 130.
82. Individual states may wish to select a higher or lower amount. For a similar proposal,
including the proposal to grant the surviving spouse a minimum elective right of $50,000, see
Note, 1980 U. Ill. L.F. 277, 311.
83. If the surviving spouse is incapacitated, § 2-203(b) of the revised UPC sets forth a
special provision for the management and ultimate disposition of the elective-share amount or
the supplemental elective-share amount. These amounts, to the extent payable from the
decedent's probate or reclaimable estates, are to be placed into a custodial or support trust for
the surviving spouse. Enacting states are given a choice as to whether to authorize the trustee
of this trust to take governmental benefits such as Medicaid into account in expending the
assets of this trust for the spouse's support.
For a discussion of whether under conventional elective-share law an insolvent or Medicaid-
assisted surviving spouse, incapacitated or not, can forgo an elective share in order to defeat
his or her creditors or in order to continue to qualify for Medicaid assistance, see Hirsch, The
Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 587, 640-45 (1989); see also State v.
Jakubowski, 16 Conn. L. Trib. (No. 30, July 30, 1990) p. 3 1 (Conn. Super. Ct., June 13, 1990)
(holding that state assistance agency had right to appeal probate decree of distribution when
surviving spouse's conservator failed to elect to take statutory share on her behalf); Estate of
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In short, no matter how brief or extended, happy or unhappy a
marriage was, a decedent with ample means should not be able to leave the
survivor impoverished, and the minimum elective-share feature of the
redesigned system seeks to prevent him or her from doing so.
b. Augmented-Estate Concept
I do not want to leave the elective share without mentioning another
aspect of the overall problem. This is the problem of "fraud on the spouse's
share." It arises when the decedent seeks to evade the spouse's elective
share by engaging in various kinds of nominal inter vivos transfers, such as
revocable inter vivos trusts. To render that type of behavior ineffective, the
pre-1990 UPC picked up New York and Pennsylvania's augmented-estate
concept, which extended the forced-share entitlement via the augmented-
estate concept to property that was the subject of specified types of inter
vivos transfer.8
4
In the redesign of the elective share, the revised UPC strengthens the
augmented-estate concept. Students of the pre-1990 UPC (and of the New
York and Pennsylvania provision) will know that several loopholes were left
ajar in the augmented estate-a notable one being life insurance the
decedent buys, naming someone other than his or her surviving spouse as
the beneficiary. With appropriate protection for the insurance company
that pays off the beneficiary before receiving notice of an elective-share
claim,85 the redesigned elective-share closes that loophole, as well as the
others.8 6
D. Section 2-301: Spouse's Protection in the Case of a Premarital Will
The elective-share apparatus is not the only protection the UPC
provides a disinherited surviving spouse. There is another provision that
might come into play, a provision unique to the UPC. This is section 2-301,
the omitted-spouse provision. Its purpose is to protect the surviving spouse
against unintentional disinheritance.
Schoolnik, 15 Conn. L. Trib. (No. 48, Dec. 4, 1989) p. 28 (Conn. Prob. Ct., Oct. 27, 1989)
(requiring a Medicaid-assisted surviving spouse to elect to take her statutory share). The
author wishes to thank David L. Hemond, Chief Attorney of the Connecticut Law Revision
Commission, for bringing theJakubowski case to his attention and Professor Mary Moers Wenig
for bringing the Schoolnik case to his attention.
84. If an elective-share law is to have any integrity, these nominal inter vivos transfers
must be subjected to the forced-share entitlement. The same problem arises under the federal
estate tax. An elective share that applies only to the decedent's probate assets is like a federal
estate tax whose only provision is IRC § 2033, which includes in the gross estate property
owned at death. In the early estate tax statutes, Congress recognized this problem and
included provisions bringing into the gross estate various types of inter vivos transfers, such as
transfers with a retained power to revoke, transfers with a retained life estate, joint tenancies,
and life insurance. The state elective-share system must do the same, and the UPC's
augmented-estate concept or something akin to it is the method to follow, rather than to throw
it to the judiciary to try to erect stop-gap measures on a case-by-case basis, as in cases such as
Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1984) or Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,
9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
85. See UPC § 2-202(e) (1990).
86. See UPC § 2-202(b)(2)(iii) (1990).
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Nearly all states and the UPC have a similar type of statute for
children, called a "pretermitted-heir" statute. These statutes typically grant
children born after the execution of the will a measure of protection from
being unintentionally disinherited. Although pretermitted-heir statutes are
common, protection for the decedent's surviving spouse against the provi-
sions of a premarital will is rare outside the UPC states.87 The UPC's
omitted-spouse provision stands in addition to the apparatus of the elective
share. The purpose is partly to reduce the frequency of elections under the
elective share, and thus to reduce the number of times the augmented-
estate procedure is invoked. Another purpose is to provide a share for the
surviving spouse more related to the amount the decedent probably would
have wanted to give, had the decedent gotten around to revising the
premarital will.
Under the omitted-spouse provision of the pre-1990 UPC, a surviving
spouse disinherited by a premarital will was given a right to an intestate
share. The provision was meant to be intent-effectuating, not intent-
defeating. Thus, unlike the elective-share provisions, the omitted-spouse
provision yields to a contrary intention stated by the decedent in the
premarital will or inferred from circumstances, such as if the will was made
in contemplation of the marriage.
When this provision was first drafted, it probably was thought to
operate principally with respect to a first marriage. With the remnarriage
phenomenon on the increase, and with the revisions dramatically increas-
ing the intestate share of the surviving spouse, the UPC drafters paid
additional attention to the omitted-spouse provision.
A particular concern was the impact of this provision on the elective
share discussed in the last example. In that example, we began with Ben
and Elaine having lived a long married life to each other, a marriage that
produced children. Then, after Ben died, Elaine married Carl. It would not
be exceptional if, during their maniage, Ben and Elaine executed mutual
wills in which each devised the entire estate to the other if the other
survives, but if not, to their children. Were this the situation, Elaine would
succeed to Ben's entire estate upon his death; Elaine would have had no
reason to claim an elective share. It also would not be exceptional if, after
Ben's death, Elaine never executed another will, even after marrying Carl.
Acting without the advice of competent legal counsel, she could hardly be
expected to appreciate the need to do so, considering the fact that her new
will would merely repeat the provisions in her old will for her children.
This is the type of late-in-life marriage in which Elaine's instincts
would be to continue providing for her children from her first marriage.
For this type of late-in-life marriage, the UPC's redesigned elective share
grants Carl either no claim or a very modest claim against Elaine's estate.
However, if Carl could use the omitted-spouse provision instead of the
87. The earlier approach to the problem took the form of the common-law doctrines,
sometimes codified, revoking a person's will if the person later married. As elective-share
statutes came to replace dower and curtesy, the elective share was thought to provide sufficient
protection in the situation of a premarital will.
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elective-share apparatus to take a much bigger portion, he could defeat the
purpose of redesigning the elective share. Unless Elaine and Carl entered
into a premarital agreement, Carl would be able to use the pre-1990 UPC
omitted-spouse provision to accomplish this.
The 1990 revisions solve this problem. The amended omitted-spouse
provision provides the spouse who is omitted from a premarital will to an
intestate share only in that portion of the decedent's estate which is neither
devised to the decedent's children by a prior marriage nor devised to their
descendants.88 In our example, Carl would receive nothing under the
omitted-spouse provision, and would be remitted to the marital-sharing
principle implemented by the redesigned elective-share apparatus.
But the omitted-spouse provision still can play a useful role. In the
case of a first marriage, in which the decedent spouse executes a premarital
will to benefit his or her parents or siblings, the omitted spouse provision
confers the full intestate share upon the omitted spouse. This provision is
not restricted to first marriages, but applies to all marriages. To the extent
that any premarital will favors persons other than the children of a prior
marriage, the surviving spouse is entitled to a full intestate share. That
share very well might be the entire estate and, consequently, might
properly give the spouse much more than he or she would be entitled to
under the elective-share apparatus.
III. CONCLUSION
The current trend toward multiple marriages is apparently unremit-
ting. Probate laws must respond intelligently to these changes and others
that are sure to follow. The current probate laws, including those in the
pre-1990 UPC, are ill-suited to the present times. The drafters of the UPC
believe that the statutory provisions discussed in this Artide are a step in the
right direction.
As with any uniform laws project, the final package reflects a multi-
tude of policy choices upon which reasonable minds can differ. Arguments
for making a different choice here and a different choice there can be
made. The most that any uniform laws project can hope to achieve is
well-crafted legislation that reasonably balances competing interests. No
process, not even one as open and broadly participatory as that of
NCCUSL, can produce legislation upon which all persons completely
agree.
The revised UPC is therefore not presented as the "right" answer,
accompanied by a claim that all other possible answers are "wrong." Rather,
it is presented as a reasonable package, one that is well thought-out and
whose individual parts add up to a coherent whole. As such, the UPC
drafters and their sponsoring organization, NCCUSL, believe their revi-
88. The actual terms of § 2-301 do not speak of children by a prior marriage, but speak
of "a child of the testator who was born before the testator married the surviving spouse and
who is not a child of the surviving spouse" and of "a descendant of such a child."
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sions are a suitable response to the multiple-marriage society and are
destined to be the model for American law deep into the next century.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE 1990 UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE PERTAINING TO THE MULTIPLE-
MARRIAGE SOCIETY
SPOUSE'S SHARE IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION
SECTION 2-102. SHARE OF SPOUSE. The intestate share of a
decedent's surviving spouse is:
(1) the entire intestate estate if:
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the
decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also
descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descen-
dant of the surviving spouse who survives the decedent;
(2) the first [$200,000], plus three-fourths of any balance of
the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the
decedent, but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent;
(3) the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any balance of the
intestate estate, if all of the decedent's surviving descendants are
also descendants of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse
has one or more surviving descendants who are not descendants
of the decedent;
(4) the first [$100,000], plus one-half of any balance of the
intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent's surviving
descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.
REDESIGNED ELECTIVE SHARE
SECTION 2-201. ELECTIVE SHARE.
(a) [Elective-Share Amount.] The surviving spouse of a dece-
dent who dies domiciled in this State has a right of election, under
the limitations and conditions stated in this Part, to take an
elective-share amount equal to the value of the elective-share
percentage of the augmented estate, determined by the length of
time the spouse and the decedent were married to each other, in
accordance with the following schedule:
If the decendent and the The elective-share
spouse were married to percentage is:
each other:
Less than 1 year .............. Supplemental Amount Only.
1 year but less than 2 years ...... 3% of the augmented estate.
2, years but less than 3 years ..... 6% of the augmented estate.
3 years but less than 4 years ..... 9% of the augmented estate.
4 years but less than 5 years .... 12% of the augmented estate.
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5 years but less than 6 years .... 15% of the augmented estate.
6 years but less than 7 years .... 18% of the augmented estate.
7 years but less than 8 years .... 21% of the augmented estate.
8 years but less than 9 years .... 24% of the augmented estate.
9 years but less than 10 years ... 27% of the augmented estate.
10 years but less than 11 years .30% of the augmented estate.
11 years but less than 12 years .34% of the augmented estate.
12 years but less than 13 years .38% of the augriented estate.
13 years but less than 14 years .42% of the augmented estate.
14 years but less than 15 years .46% of the augmented estate.
15 years or more ............ 50% of the augmented estate.
(b) [Supplemental Elective-Share Amount.] If the sum of the
amounts described in Sections 2-202(b)(3) and (4), 2-207(a)(1) and
(3), and that part of the elective-share amount payable from the
decedent's probate and reclaimable estates under Sections 2-
207(b) and (c) is less than [$50,000], the surviving spouse is
entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount equal to
[$50,000], minus the sum of the amounts described in those
sections. The supplemental elective-share amount is payable from
the decedent's probate estate and from recipients of the dece-
dent's reclaimable estate in the order of priority set forth in
Sections 2-207(b) and (c).
(c) [Non-Domiciliary.] The right, if any, of the surviving
spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled outside this State to take
an elective share in property in this State is governed by the law of
the decedent's domicile at death.
SECTION 2-202. AUGMENTED ESTATE.
(a) [Definitions.]
(1) In this section:
(i) "Bona fide purchaser" means a purchaser for value in
good faith and without notice of an adverse claim. The notation of
a state documentary fee on a recorded instrument pursuant to
[insert appropriate reference] is prima facie evidence that the
transfer described therein was made to a bona fide purchaser.
(ii) "Nonadverse party" means a person who does not
have a substantial beneficial interest in the trust or other property
arrangement that would be adversely affected by the exercise or
nonexercise of the power that he [or she] possesses respecting the
trust or other property arrangement. A person having a general
power of appointment over property is deemed to have a bene-
ficial interest in the property.
(iii) "Presently exercisable general power of appoint-
ment" means a power of appointment under which, at the time in
question, the decedent by an exercise of the power could have
created an interest, present or future, in himself [or herself] or his
[or her] creditors.
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(iv) "Probate estate" means property, whether real or
personal, movable or immovable, wherever situated, that would
pass by intestate succession if the decedent died without a valid
will.
(v) "Right to income" includes a right to payments under
an annuity or similar contractual arrangement.
(vi) "Value of property owned by the surviving spouse at
the decedent's death" and "value of property to which the
surviving spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's death"
include the commuted value of any present or future interest then
held by the surviving spouse and the commuted value of amounts
payable to the surviving spouse after the decedent's death under
any trust, life insurance settlement option, annuity contract,
public or private pension, disability compensation, death benefit
or retirement plan, or any similar arrangement, exclusive of the
federal Social Security system.
(2) In subsections (b)(2)(iii) and (iv), "transfer" includes an
exercise or release of a power of appointment, but does not
include a lapse of a power of appointment.
(b) [Property Included in Augmented Estate.] The aug-
mented estate consists of the sum of:
(1) the value of the decedent's probate estate, reduced by
funeral and administration expenses, homestead allowance, fam-
ily allowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims89;
(2) the value of the decedent's reclaimable estate, which is
composed of all property, whether real or personal, movable or
immovable, wherever situated, not included in the decedent's
probate estate, of any of the following types:
(i) property to the extent the passing of the principal
thereof to or for the benefit of any person, other than the
decedent's surviving spouse, was subject to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment held by the decedent alone, if the
decedent held that power immediately before his [or her] death or
if and to the extent the decedent, while married to his [or her]
surviving spouse and during the two-year period next preceding
the decedent's death, released that power or exercised that power
in favor of any person other than the decedent or the decedent's
estate, spouse, or surviving spouse;
(ii) property, to the extent of the decedent's unilaterally
severable interest therein, held by the decedent and any other
person, except the decedent's surviving spouse, with right of
survivorship, if the decedent held that interest immediately before
his [or her] death or if and to the extent the decedent, while
89. As defined in § 1-201, the term "claims" includes "liabilities of the decedent or
protected person whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the estate
which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of a conservator,
including funeral expenses and expenses of administration. The term does not include estate
or inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person
to specific assets alleged to be included in the estate."
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married to his [or her] surviving spouse and during the two-year
period next preceding the decedent's death, transferred that
interest to any person other than the decedent's surviving spouse;
(iii) proceeds of insurance, including accidental death
benefits, on the life of the decedent payable to any person other
than the decedent's surviving spouse, if the decedent owned the
insurance policy, had the power to change the beneficiary of the
insurance policy, or the insurance policy was subject to a presently
exercisable general power of appointment held by the decedent
alone immediately before his [or her] death or if and to the extent
the decedent, while married to his [or her] surviving spouse and
during the two-year period next preceding the decedent's death,
transferred that policy to any person other than the decedent's
surviving spouse; and
(iv) property transferred by the decedent to any person
other than a bona fide purchaser at any time during the dece-
dent's marriage to the surviving spouse, to or for the benefit of
any person, other than the decedent's surviving spouse, if the
transfer is of any of the following types:
(A) any transfer to the extent that the decedent re-
tained at the time of or during the two-year period next preceding
his [or her] death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to
income from, the property;
(B) any transfer to the extent that, at the time of or
during the two-year period next preceding the decedent's death,
the income or principal was subject to a power, exercisable by the
decedent alone or in conjunction with any other person or
exercisable by a nonadverse party, for the benefit of the decedent
or the decedent's estate;
(C) any transfer of property, to the extent the dece-
dent's contribution to it, as a percentage of the whole, was made
within two years before the decedent's death, by which the
property is held, at the time of or during the two-year period next
preceding the decedent's death, by the decedent and another,
other than the decedent's surviving spouse, with right of survi-
vorship; or
(D) any transfer made to a donee within two years
before the decedent's death to the extent that the aggregate
transfers to any one donee in either of the years exceed
$10,000.00;
(3) the value of property to which the surviving spouse
succeeds by reason of the decedent's death, other than by home-
stead allowance, exempt property, family allowance, testate suc-
cession, or intestate succession, including the proceeds of insur-
ance, including accidental death benefits, on the life of the
decedent and benefits payable under a retirement plan in which
the decedent was a participait, exclusive of the federal Social
Security system; and
(4.) the value of property owned by the surviving spouse at
[1991]
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the decedent's death, reduced by enforceable claims against that
property or that spouse, plus the value of amounts that would
have been includible in the surviving spouse's reclaimable estate
had the spouse predeceased the decedent. But amounts that
would have been includible in the surviving spouse's reclaimable
estate under subsection (b)(2)(iii) are not valued as if he [or she]
were deceased.
(c) [Exclusions.] Any transfer or exercise or release of a
power of appointment is excluded from the decedent's reclaim-
able estate (i) to the extent the decedent received adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth for the transfer,
exercise, or release or (ii) if irrevocably made with the written
consent or joinder of the surviving spouse.
(d) [Valuati6n.] Property is valued as of the decedent's death,
but property irrevocably transferred during the two-year period
next preceding the decedent's death which is included in the
decedent's reclaimable estate under subsection (b)(2)(i), (ii), and
(iv) is valued as of the time of the transfer. If the terms of more
than one of the subparagraphs or sub-subparagraphs of subsec-
tion (b)(2) apply, the property is included in the augmented estate
under the subparagraph or sub- subparagraph that yields the
highest value. For the purposes of this subsection, an "irrevocable
transfer of property" includes an irrevocable exercise or release of
a power of appointment.
(e) [Protection of Payors and Other Third Parties.]
(1) Although under this section a payment, item of prop-
erty, or other benefit is included in the decedent's reclaimable
estate, a payor 90 or other third party is not liable for having made
a payment or transferred an item of property or other benefit to
a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, 91 or for
having taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity
of a governing instrument, upon request and satisfactory proof of
the decedent's death, before the payor or other third party
received written notice from the surviving spouse or spouse's
representative of an intention to file a petition for the elective
share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed. A
payor or other third party is liable for payments made or other
actions taken after the payor or other third party received written
90. As defined in § 1-201, the term "payor" means "a trustee, insurer, business entity,
employer, government, governmental agency or subdivision, or any other person authorized
or obligated by law or a governing instrument to make payments."
91. As defined in § 1-201, the term "beneficiary designated in a governing instrument"
includes a "grantee of a deed, a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a beneficiary of a beneficiary
designation, a donee, appointee, or taker in default of a power of appointment, or a person in
whose favor a power of attorney or a power held in any individual, fiduciary, or representative
capacity is exercised" and the term "governing instrument" means a "deed, will, trust,
insurance or annuity policy, account with POD designation, security registered in beneficiary
form (TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating
or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a donative, appointive, or
nominative instrument bf any other type."
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notice of an intention to file a petition for the elective share or that
a petition for the elective share has been filed.
(2) The written notice of intention to file a petition for the
elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed
must be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or
home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or
served upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as
a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of
intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition
for the elective share has been filed, a payor or other third party
may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of
property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the
probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estate, or if no
proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having
jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents' estates
located in the county of the decedent's residence. The court shall
hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination
under Section 2-205(d), shall order disbursement in accordance
with the determination. If no petition is filed in the court within
the specified time under Section 2-205(a) or, if filed, the demand
for an elective share is withdrawn under Section 2-205(c), the
court shall order disbursement to the designated beneficiary.
Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court
discharge the payor or other third party from all claims for the
value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or
deposited with the Court.
(3) Upon petition to the probate court by the beneficiary
designated in a governing instrument, the court may order that all
or part of the property be paid to the beneficiary in an amount
and subject to conditions consistent with this section.
(f) [Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers; Personal Liability
of Recipient.]
(1) A person who purchases property from a recipient for
value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item
of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable
obligation, is neither obligated under this Part to return the
payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this Part
for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of
property or benefit. But a person who, not for value, receives a
payment, item of property, or any other benefit included in the
decedent's reclaimable estate is obligated to return the payment,
item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount
of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, as
provided in Section 2-207.
(2) If any section or part of any section of this Part is
preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of
property, or any other benefit included in the decedent's reclaim-
able estate, a person who, not for value, receives the payment,
item of property, or any other benefit is obligated to return that
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payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for
the amount of that payment or the value of that item of property
or benefit, as provided in Section 2-207, to the person who would
have been entitled to it were that section or part of that section not
preempted.
SECTION 2-203. RIGHT OF ELECTION PERSONAL TO SUR-
VIVING SPOUSE.
(a) [Surviving Spouse Must Be Living at Time of Election.]
The right of election may be exercised only by a surviving spouse
who is livin when the petition for the elective share is filed in the
court under Section 2-205(a). If the election is not exercised by the
surviving spouse personally, it may be exercised on the surviving'
spouse's behalf by his [or her] conservator, guardian, or agent
under the authority of a power of attorney.
(b) [Incapacitated Surviving Spouse.] If the election is exer-
cised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated
person,92 that portion of the elective-share and supplemental
elective-share amounts due from the decedent's probate estate
and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate under Sections
2-207(b) and (c) must be placed in a custodial trust for the benefit
of the surviving spouse under the provisions of the [Enacting
state] Uniform Custodial Trust Act, except as modified below. For
the purposes of this subsection, an election on behalf of a
surviving spouse by an agent under a durable power of attorney
is presumed to be on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an
incapacitated person. For purposes of the custodial trust estab-
lished by this subsection, (i) the electing guardian, conservator, or
agent is the custodial trustee, (ii) the surviving spouse is the
beneficiary, (iii) the custodial trust is deemed to have been created
by the decedent spouse by written transfer that takes effect at the
decedent spouse's death and that directs the custodial trustee to
administer the custodial trust as for an incapacitated beneficiary.
(c) [Custodial Trust.] For the purposes of subsection (b), the
[Enacting state] Uniform Custodial Trust Act must be applied as
if Section 6(b) thereof were repealed and Sections 2(e), 9(b), and
17(a) were amended to read as follows:
(1) Neither an incapacitated beneficiary nor anyone acting
on behalf of an incapacitated beneficiary has a power to terminate
the custodial trust; but if the beneficiary regains capacity, the
beneficiary then acquires the power to terminate the custodial
trust by delivering to the custodial trustee a writing signed by the
beneficiary declaring the termination. If not previously termi-
92. As defined in § 5-103, the term "incapacitated person" means "any person who is
impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced
age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except minority) to the extent
of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible deci-
sions." A recommendation is pending to delete "advanced age" from this definition.
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nated, the custodial trust terminates on the death of the benefi-
ciary.
(2) If the beneficiary is incapacitated, the custodial trustee
shall expend so much or all of the custodial trust property as the
custodial trustee considers advisable for the use and benefit of the
beneficiary and individuals who were supported by the benefi-
ciary when the beneficiary became incapacitated, or who are
legally entitled to support by the beneficiary. Expenditures may
be made in the manner, when, and to the extent that the custodial
trustee determines suitable and proper, without court order but
with regard to other support, income, and property of the
beneficiary [exclusive of] [and] benefits of medical or other forms
of assistance from any state or federal government or governmen-
tal agency for which the beneficiary must qualify on the basis of
need.
(3) Upon the beneficiary's death, the remaining custodial
trust property, in the following order: (i) under the residuary
clause, if any, of the will of the beneficiary's predeceased spouse
against whom the elective share was taken, as if that predeceased
spouse died immediately after the beneficiary; or (ii) to that
predeceased spouse's heirs under Section 2-711 of [this State's]
Uniform Probate Code.
[STATES THAT HAVE NOT ADOPTED THE UNIFORM
CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT SHOULD ADOPT THE FOLLOW-
ING ALTERNATIVE SUBSECTION (B) AND NOT ADOPT
SUBSECTION (B) OR (C) ABOVE].
[(b) [Incapacitated Surviving Spouse.] If the election is exer-
cised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated
person, the court must set aside that portion of the elective-share
and supplemental elective-share amounts due from the dece-
dent's probate estate and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable
estate under Section 2-207(b) and (c) and must appoint a trustee
to administer that property for the support of the surviving
spouse. For the purposes of this subsection, an election on behalf
of a surviving spouse by an agent under a durable power of
attorney is presumed to be on behalf of a surviving spouse who is
an incapacitated person. The trustee must administer the trust in
accordance with the following terms and such additional terms as
the court determines7 appropriate:
(1) Expenditures of income and principal may be made in
the manner, when, and to the extent that the trustee determines
suitable and proper for the surviving spouse's support, without
court order but with regard to other support, income, and
property of the surviving spouse [exclusive of] [and] benefits of
medical or other forms of assistance from any state or federal
government or governmental agency for which the surviving
spouse must qualify on the basis of need.
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(2) During the surviving spouse's incapacity, neither the
surviving spouse nor anyone acting on behalf of the surviving
spouse has a power to terminate the trust; but if the surviving
spouse regains capacity, the surviving spouse then acquires the
power to terminate the trust and acquire full ownership of the
trust property free of trust, by delivering to the trustee a writing
signed by the surviving spouse declaring the termination.
(3) Upon the surviving spouse's death, the trustee shall
transfer the unexpended trust property in the following order: (i)
under the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the predeceased
spouse against whom the elective share was taken, as if that
predeceased spouse died immediately after the surviving spouse;
or (ii) to that predeceased spouse's heirs under Section 2-711.]
SECTION 2-204. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO ELECT AND OF
OTHER RIGHTS.
(a) The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of
the surviving spouse to homestead allowance, exempt property,
and family allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or
partially, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agree-
ment, or waiver signed by the surviving spouse.
(b) A surviving spouse's waiver is not enforceable if the
surviving spouse proves that:
(1) he [or she] did not execute the waiver voluntarily; or
(2) the waiver was unconscionable when it was executed
and, before execution of the waiver, he [or she]:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of
the property or financial obligations of the decedent;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing,
any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of
the decedent beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an
adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the
decedent.
(c) An issue of unconscionability of a waiver is for decision by
the court as a matter of law.
(d) Unless.it provides to the contrary, a waiver of "all rights,"
or equivalent language, in the property or estate of a present or
prospective spouse or a complete property settlement entered
into after or in anticipation of separation or divorce is a waiver of
all rights of elective share, homestead allowance, exempt prop-
erty, and family allowance by each spouse in the property of the
other and a renunciation by each of all benefits that would
otherwise pass to him [or her] from the other by intestate
succession or by virtue of any will executed before the waiver or
property settlement.
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SECTION 2-205. PROCEEDING FOR ELECTIVE SHARE; TIME
LIMIT.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the election must be
made by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the
personal representative, if any, a petition for the elective share
within nine months after the date of the decedent's death, or
within six months after the probate of the decedent's will, which-
ever limitation later expires. The surviving spouse must give
notice of the time and place set for hearing to persons interested
in the estate and to the distributees and recipients of portions of
the augmented estate whose interests will be adversely affected by
the taking of the elective share. Except as provided in subsection
(b), the decedent's reclaimable estate, described in Section 2-
202(b)(2), is not included within the augmented estate for the
purpose of computing the elective share, if the petition is filed
more than nine months after the decedent's death.
(b) Within nine months after the decedent's death, the surviv-
ing spouse may petition the court for an extension of time for
making an election. If, within nine months after the decedent's
death, the spouse gives notice of the petition to all persons
interested in the decedent's reclaimable estate, the court for cause
shown by the surviving spouse may extend the time for election.
If the court grants the spouse's petition for an extension, the
decedent's reclaimable estate, described in Section 2-202(b)(2), is
not excluded from the augmented estate for the purpose of
computing the elective-share and supplemental elective-share
amounts, if the spouse makes an election by filing in the court and
mailing or delivering to the personal representative, if any, a
petition for the elective share within the time allowed by the
extension.
(c) The surviving spouse may withdraw his [or her] demand
for an elective share at any time before entry of a final determi-
nation by the court.
(d) After notice and hearing, the court shall determine the
elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts, and shall
order its payment from the assets of the augmented estate or by
contribution as appears appropriate under Section 2-207. If it
appears that a fund or property included in the augmented estate
has not come into the possession of the personal representative, or
has been distributed by the personal representative, the court
nevertheless shall fix the liability of any person who has any
interest in the fund or property or who has possession thereof,
whether as trustee or otherwise. The proceeding may be main-
tained against fewer than all persons against whom relief could be
sought, but no person is subject to contribution in any greater
amount than he [or she] would have been under Section 2-207
had relief been secured against all persons subject to contribution.
(e) An order or judgment of the court may be enforced as
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necessary in suit for contribution or payment in other courts of
this State or other jurisdictions.
SECTION 2-206. EFFECT OF ELECTION ON STATUTORY BEN-
EFITS. If the right of election is exercised by or on behalf of the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse's homestead allowance, exempt property, and
family allowance, if any, are not charged against but are in addition to the
elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts.
SECTION 2-207. CHARGING SPOUSE WITH OWNED ASSETS
AND GIFTS RECEIVED; LIABILITY OF OTHERS FOR BALANCE OF
ELECTIVE SHARE.
(a) [Elective-Share Amount Only.] In a proceeding for an
elective share, the following are applied first to satisfy the elective-
share amount and to reduce or eliminate any contributions due
from the decedent's probate estate and recipients of the dece-
dent's reclaimable estate:
(1) amounts included in the augmented estate which pass or
have passed to the surviving spouse by testate or intestate succes-
sion;
(2) amounts included in the augmented estate under Sec-
tion 2-202(b)(3);
(3) amounts included in the augmented estate which would
have passed to the spouse but were disclaimed; and
(4) amounts included in the augmented estate under Sec-
tion 2-202(b)(4) up to the applicable percentage thereof. For the
purposes of this subsection, the "applicable percentage" is twice
the elective-share percentage set forth in the schedule in Section
2-201(a) appropriate to the length of time the spouse and the
decedent were married to each other.
(b) [Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share Amount; Supple-
mental Elective-Share Amount.] If, after the application of
subsection (a), the elective-share amount is not fully satisfied or
the surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-share
amount, amounts included in the decedent's probate estate and
that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate other than
amounts irrevocably transferred within .two years before the
decedent's death are applied first to satisfy the unsatisfied balance
of the elective-share amount or the supplemental elective-share
amount. The decedent's probate estate and that portion of the
decedent's reclaimable estate are so applied that liability for the
unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or for the sup-
plemental elective-share amount is equitably apportioned among
the recipients of the decedent's probate estate and that portion of
the decedent's reclaimable estate in proportion to the value of
their interests therein.
(c) [Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share and Supplemental
Elective-Share Amounts.] If, after the application of subsections
(a) and (b), the elective-share or supplemental elective-share
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amount is not fully satisfied, the remaining portion of the
decedent's reclaimable estate is so applied that liability for the
unsatisfied balance of the elective-share or supplemental elective-
share amount is equitably apportioned among the recipients of
that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate in proportion to
the value of their interests therein.
(d) [Liability of Recipients of Reclaimable Estate and Their
Donees.] Only original recipients of the reclaimable estate de-
scribed in Section 2-202(b)(2), and the donees of the recipients of
the reclaimable estate to the extent the donees have the property
or its proceeds, are liable to make a proportional contribution
toward satisfaction of the surviving spouse's elective-share or
supplemental elective-share amount. A person liable to make
contribution may choose to give up the proportional part of the
reclaimable estate or to pay the value of the amount for which he
[or she] is liable.
SPOUSE'S PROTECTION IN THE CASE OF A PREMARITAL WILL
SECTION 2-301. ENTITLEMENT OF SPOUSE; PREMARITAL
WILL.
(a) If a testator's surviving spouse married the testator after
the testator executed his [or her] will, the surviving spouse is
entitled to receive, as an intestate share, no less than the value of
the share of the estate he [or she] would have received if the
testator had died intestate as to that portion of the testator's estate,
if any, that neither is devised to a child of the testator who was
born before the testator married the surviving spouse and who is
not a child of the surviving spouse nor is devised or passes under
Sections 2-603 or 2-60493 to a descendant of such a child, unless:
(1) it appears from the will or other evidence that the will
was made in contemplation of the testator's marriage to the
surviving spouse;
(2) the will expresses the intention that it is to be effective
notwithstanding any subsequent marriage; or
(3) the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside
the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision is shown by the testator's statements or is reasonably
infer-red from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
(b) In satisfying the share provided by this section, devises
made by the will to the testator's surviving spouse, if any, are
applied first, and other devises, other than a devise to a child of
the testator who was born before the testator married the surviv-
ing spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse or a
devise or substitute gift under Sections 2-603 or 2-604 to a
descendant of such a child, abate as provided in Section 3-902.
93. Sections 2-603 and 2-604 are the UPC's antilapse statutes.
[1991]
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REVOCATION-UPON-DIVORCE PROVISION
SECTION 2-804. REVOCATION OF PROBATE AND NONPRO-
BATE TRANSFERS BY DIVORCE; NO REVOCATION BY OTHER
CHANGES OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
(a) [Definitions.] In this section:
(1) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a
transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a benefi-
ciary designated in a governing instrument.
94
(2) "Divorce or annulment" means any divorce or annul-
ment, or any dissolution or declaration of invalidity of a marriage,
that would exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse within the
meaning of Section 2-802. A decree of separation that does not
terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for
purposes of this section.
(3) "Divorced individual" includes an individual whose mar-
riage has been annulled.
(4) "Governing instrument" refers to a governing
instrument 95 executed by the divorced individual before the
divorce or annulment of his [or her] marriage to his [or her]
former spouse.
(5) "Relative of the divorced individual's former spouse"
means an individual who is related to the divorced individual's
former spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity and who, after the
divorce or annulment, is not related to the divorced individual by
blood, adoption, or affinity.
(6) "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appointment,
provision, or nomination, means one under which the divorced
individual, at the time of the divorce or annulment, was alone
empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel
the designation in favor of his [or her] former spouse or former
spouse's relative, whether or not the divorced individual was then
empowered to designate himself [or herself] in place of his [or
her] former spouse or in place of his [or her] former spouse's
relative and whether or not the divorced individual then had the
capacity to exercise the power.
(b) [Revocation Upon Divorce.] Except as provided by the
express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a
contract relating to the division of the marital estate made
between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage,
divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage:
(1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of
property made by a divorced individual to his [or her] former
spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appoint-
94. See supra note 91 for the definitions of the terms "beneficiary designated in a
governing instrument" and "governing instrument."
95. See supra note 91 for the definition of the term "governing instrument."
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ment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of
the divorced individual's former spouse, (ii) provision in a gov-
erning instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of
appointment on the divorced individual's former spouse or on a
relative of the divorced individual's former spouse, and (iii)
nomination in a governing instrument, nominating a divorced
individual's former spouse or a relative of the divorced individu-
al's former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative
capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee,
conservator, agent, or guardian; and
(2) severs the interests of the former spouses in property
held by them at the time of the divorce or annulment as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship [, or as community property
with the right of survivorship], 96 transforming the interests of the
former spouses into tenancies in common.
(c) [Effect of Severance.] A severance under subsection (b)(2)
does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for
value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivor-
ship in the survivor of the former spouses unless a writing
deckring the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or
recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the
property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of trans-
actions involving such property, as evidence of ownership.
(d) [Effect of Revocation.] Provisions of a governing instru-
ment that are not revoked by this section are given effect as if the
former spouse and relatives of the former spouse disclaimed07 the
revoked provisions or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a
fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the former spouse and
relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the
divorce or annulment.
(e) [Revival if Divorce Nullified.] Provisions revoked solely
by this section are revived by the divorced individual's remarriage
to the former spouse or by a nullification of the divorce or
annulment.
(f) [No Revocation for Other Change of Circumstances.] No
change of circumstances other than as described in this section
and in Section 2-803 effects a revocation.
96. As defined in § 1-201, the terms 'Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and
"community property with the right of survivorship" "includeleft bracketright bracket co-
owners of property held under circumstances that entitle one or more to the whole of the
property on the death of the other or others, but excludeleft bracketright bracket forms of co-
ownership registration in which the underlying ownership of each party is in proportion to
that party's contribution."
97. Under the UPC's disclaimer provision, § 2-801, a disclaimant, generally speaking, is
treated as if he or she predeceased the decedent in the case of a transfer under a testamentary
instrument and predeceased the effective date of the instrument or contract in the case of a
transfer under a nontestamentary instrument or contract.
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(g) [Protection of Payors and Other Third Parties.]
(1) A payor 98 or other third party is not liable for having
made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other
benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument
affected by a divorce, annulment, or remarriage, or for having
taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the
governing instrument, before the payor or other third party
received written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage.
A payor or other third party is liable for a payment made or other
action taken after the payor or other third party received written
notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section.
(2) Written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage
under subsection (g)(2) must be mailed to the payor's or other
third party's main office or home by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, or served upon the payor or other third
party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon
receipt of written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage,
a payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer
or deposit any item of property held by it to or with the court
having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the
decedent's estate or, if no proceedings have been commenced, to
or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings
relating to decedents' estates located in the county of the dece-
dent's residence. The court shall hold the funds or item of
property and, upon its determination under this section, shall
order disbursement or transfer in accordance with the determi-
nation. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court
discharge the payor or other third party from all claims for the
value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or
deposited with the court.
(h) [Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers; Personal Liability
of Recipient.]
(1) A person who purchases property from a former
spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person for value
and without notice, or who receives from a former spouse, relative
of a former spouse, or any other person a payment or other item
of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable
obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the
payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this
section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of
property or benefit. But a former spouse, relative of a former
spouse, or other person who, not for value, received a payment,
item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not
entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item
of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of
the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the
person who is entitled to it under this section.
98. See supra note 90 for the definition of the term "payor."
HeinOnline  -- 76 Iowa L. Rev. 271 1990-1991
272 76 IOWA LAW REVIEW 223 [1991]
(2) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by
federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any
other benefit covered by this section, a former spouse, relative of
the former spouse, or any other person who, not for value,
received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to
which that person is not entitled under this section is obligated to
return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally
liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of
property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled
to it were this section or part of this section not preempted.
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